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UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES ON
GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING PROCESSES AS A WAY
TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
BY
DAVID L. MARKELL∗

This Article explores possible insights from the “procedural
justice” literature about features of government decision making
processes that citizens are likely to consider to be particularly valuable
or important. Numerous commentators have urged that the government
take steps to increase citizen participation in its decision making
processes as a way to offset concerns about government legitimacy.
The premise of the Article is that incorporating into government
decision making processes features that are important to citizens is a
potentially helpful step in fostering meaningful citizen participation.
Processes that citizens value are more likely to be processes that
citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in government, while
processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are more likely
to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input; they
may even operate to undermine citizen confidence.
This Article reviews a framework that the procedural justice
literature proposes for assessing citizen satisfaction with decision
making processes, and it applies this framework to an international
decision making process that relies heavily on citizen participation, the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s (CEC) citizen
submissions process. This process, which empowers citizens to file
complaints in which they claim that any of the North American
countries is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its
environmental laws, was created with the hope that it would increase
government accountability and transparency, and inform and thereby
improve the exercise of agency discretion. This Article considers the
track record of the process in light of the procedural justice literature
in an effort to advance thinking about the design of government
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agency officials in the contemporary administrative state have
enormous power to carry out the work of government.1 While the President,2
Congress,3 and Judiciary4 each has some capacity to serve as an institutional
check on the actions of agency officials,5 it is widely believed and
understood that despite these checks agency staff have “staggering
discretion” in carrying out their responsibilities.6
1 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (noting that “[o]ver the past century, the powers and
responsibilities of administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the
constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2094 (2005)
(indicating that administrative agencies “constitute the basic, operational structure of modern
government”).
2 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001)
(discussing the relationship between the executive branch and the administrative state).
3 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the
Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 150–60 (reviewing mechanisms
for legislative oversight of agencies); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) (discussing the role of Congress in the administrative state).
4 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (discussing judicial review of administrative decision making).
5 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 783–90 (1999) (outlining ways in which agencies are held
democratically accountable).
6 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion (Stanford Pub. Law &
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 116, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854364
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The enormous power that unelected agency officials wield, with limited
oversight, has spawned an extensive literature concerning the legitimacy of
the administrative state.7 Indeed, Professor Jody Freeman has suggested that
“[a]dministrative law scholarship has organized itself largely around the
need to defend the administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy.” 8
These accusations have focused on a variety of purported flaws, including
unaccountability of agency officials,9 a lack of transparency in the operation
of the state,10 limited opportunities for public participation,11 and
dissatisfaction with agency performance.12
The question of how institutions build legitimacy is an extraordinarily
difficult one that remains largely “unanswered.”13 There has been strong
support for increasing citizens’ opportunities to participate in governance as
a way to increase government legitimacy and to address some of these
perceived flaws in the operation of the administrative state. Professor Jim
Rossi, for example, suggests that “[o]ver the last thirty years or so, courts,
Congress, and scholars have elevated participation to a sacrosanct status.”14

(discussing administrative discretion); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 157, 157–68 (1996) (addressing the reviewability of administrative decisions);
Levin, supra note 4, at 693–702.
7 Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1512. For a discussion of institutional legitimacy, see, for
example, James L. Gibson, et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003).
8 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (2000).
9 See RICHARD MULGAN, HOLDING POWER TO ACCOUNT: ACCOUNTABILITY IN MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 36 (2003) (discussing government accountability); see generally ROBERT D. BEHN,
RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2001) (discussing the evolution of accountability in
various forms of government).
10 Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998) (referring to the “administrative process” as the “proverbial black
box that mysteriously translates legislative inputs into regulatory outcomes”); ARCHON FUNG, ET
AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 6
(Dec. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance
and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), available at
http://www.archonfung.net/papers/FGWEffectiveness.pdf (noting that transparency systems—
systems that require organizations to provide the public with information about their
practices—have become increasingly popular over the past several years to the point that some
commentators have referred to them as a “third wave” of regulation).
11 See, e.g., Croley, supra note 10, at 97 (discussing how the administrative state does not
“encourage widespread participation”).
12 Commentators have raised an enormous array of other concerns about the administrative
state such as “capture” of the regulatory process, among others. See, e.g., Michael E. Levine &
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 (1990) (discussing capture theory).
13 Gibson, supra note 7, at 556 (2003) (concluding, in a study of the U.S. Supreme Court, that
“[u]nderstanding how institutions acquire and spend legitimacy remains one of the most
important unanswered questions for those interested in the power and influence of judicial
institutions”); James L. Gibson, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, AM. POL. SCI. REV.,
June 1998, at 343, 344 (noting that the “most important question in legitimacy research [is] how
institutions acquire and sustain legitimacy.”)
14 Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174–75 (1997). The same trend towards
increased citizen involvement exists at the international level. For example, in the
environmental arena, the 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 10 provides that “[e]nvironmental
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He notes that “recent reform efforts are consistently geared to enhance
broad-based participation in the agency decision making process.”15 Dean
Edward Rubin similarly has observed that “[p]articipatory democracy is a
very fashionable idea these days.”16 Proponents suggest that greater
opportunities for public involvement in agency decision making processes
may help to enhance accountability and transparency in governance,
contribute to more informed, and thereby improved, results,17 and foster a
greater degree of connection between the governed and the governing (and a
blurring of the line between the two) that leads to greater social capital and
societal trust.18
This Article explores the design of governance mechanisms that are
intended to incorporate meaningful citizen involvement as a strategy to
enhance legitimacy.19 It does so by focusing attention on what is a central,
issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level” and
that “[s]tates shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making
information widely available . . . .” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Princ. 10,
3, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874.
15 Rossi, supra note 14, at 175.
16 Rubin, supra note 1, at 2104. While interest in public participation may be on the rise,
commitment to open government and active civic engagement in governance has deep roots in
the United States. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 3 (2005). Breyer writes:
The United States is a nation built upon principles of liberty. That liberty means not only
freedom from government coercion but also the freedom to participate in the
government itself. [Jefferson, Adams, and the Founders] invoked an idea of freedom as
old as antiquity, the freedom of the individual citizen to participate in the government
and thereby to share with others the right to make or to control the nation’s public acts.

Id.
17 STEPHEN MACEDO ET AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 4 (2005); THE ACCESS INITIATIVE—UNITED STATES,
AT THE FRONTLINES OF DEMOCRACY: STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC VOICE IN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS 1 (June 2004), available at http://www.accessinitiative.org/pdf/TAIUS_final.pdf
(characterizing including the public in decision making as a “core principle of democracy”).
18 Societal trust in government is reported to have dropped significantly in recent years.
See, e.g., WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth
Theiss-Morse, eds., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT]; Frank B. Cross, Law and
Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457–60 (2005) (observing that law and mechanisms of governance can
serve as a tool to enhance trust or social capital, or, as a source for further disaffection—“[t]he
nature of the law seems central to societal trust”); MACEDO, supra note 17, at 4 (arguing that
“improving our institutions to promote robust citizen engagement is essential to American
democracy”); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 41–42 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=869407. Secrecy impairs trust in the legitimacy of the law and

[a]t one time, public jury trials not only educated ordinary citizens and let them see and
influence justice being done, but also contributed to the law’s democratic legitimacy. But
today, outsiders neither see nor understand nor participate much in criminal justice. The
system is too opaque and remote to educate them well. . . . This secrecy and opacity
weakens citizens’ trust in the law and may also make them feel distant and alienated.

Id.
19

There have been several efforts to recast citizens’ roles in governance in this way. See,

e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING

THE

DEREGULATION DEBATE 54–100 (1992) (proposing “tripartism”—empowering public interest
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threshold question: what is it that citizens like (and dislike) about
government decision making processes (particularly administrative agency
decision making processes) that purport to value citizen involvement?20 A
potentially valuable step in fostering citizen participation in government
decision making processes is to incorporate in these processes features that
are important to citizens.21 Processes that citizens value are likely to be
processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in
government, while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory
are likely to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input; they
may even operate to undermine citizen confidence.22
This Article explores ways in which the “procedural justice” literature
on citizen satisfaction makes it possible to shed some light on this question
of citizen preferences in government decision making processes—i.e., to
develop some insights about the types of features citizens think are most
valuable or important in decision making processes that incorporate a role
for them.23 The procedural justice literature provides a conceptual

groups in the regulatory process—as a means to address regulatory capture and corruption);
Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in
Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 303–15 (2005) (discussing tripartism,
collaborative governance, and deliberative participation as possible ways to involve citizens in
the regulatory process); Freeman, supra note 8 (proposing a collaborative state); cf. Mark
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) (voicing skepticism about same). The
administrative state is by no means monolithic and opportunities for public involvement vary
widely depending on the function involved (e.g., adjudication, rulemaking, or something else)
and, therefore, ideas for reform need to address these contextual realities. See, e.g., ASIMOW ET
AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 645 (2d ed. 1998).
20 The general topic of public attitudes toward government is receiving increasing interest.
See WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18, at 2.
21 This Article does not suggest that any particular level of citizen participation is
appropriate. There is a vast literature on the benefits and costs of citizen engagement in
governance. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 14, at 182–88 (summarizing the common justifications
for “mass participation” in agency decision making); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of
Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–75 (1997)
(listing 10 potential benefits—and three commonly raised concerns—of empowering NGOs to
participate in governance). Obviously, as discussed in more detail below, a wide variety of
factors others than citizen satisfaction with decision making processes may affect levels of
citizen participation. See, e.g., infra notes 116, 143, 153.
22 Bibas, supra note 18, at 40–41. Noting that:
[P]eople respect the law more when it is visibly fair and they have some voice or control
over its procedures. Procedural fairness, process control, and trust in insider’s motives
contribute greatly to [government’s] legitimacy. [Similarly], [w]hen citizens see that the
law reaches substantively just outcomes, the law earns moral credibility . . . [while]
[c]onversely, when the law reaches outcomes that are substantively unjust, or at least
not visibly just, citizens view the law’s judgments as less credible and less worthy of
respect.

Id. While Professor Bibas’s focus was on criminal procedure, his analysis applies to government
decision making processes more generally.
23 I make this effort fully in agreement with Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar’s insight
that we still have much to learn about both actual and potential public participation in
regulatory policy. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 417 (2005) (noting that “both . . . are complicated phenomena, full of subtleties, and
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framework for considering citizen satisfaction with opportunities for
involvement in agency decision making. This literature offers a framework
for structuring decision making processes in order to engender citizen
satisfaction by identifying features of government decision making
processes that are likely to be of particular salience to citizens.24
After reviewing a basic framework that the procedural justice literature
proposes for assessing citizen satisfaction with decision making processes, I
apply this framework to a decision making process that relies heavily on
citizen participation, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s
(CEC) citizen submissions process. This process, which empowers citizens
to file complaints in which they claim that any of the North American
countries is failing to effectively enforce one or more of its environmental
laws, was created with the hope that it would increase government
accountability and transparency, that it would inform the exercise of agency
discretion, and that it would bolster government effectiveness. As Part III
reflects, there is considerable evidence that the process is floundering (or at
least not flourishing), at least in the United States. I consider this
performance (the track record of the process) in light of the procedural
justice literature in order to explore why this may be the case, and what
might be done to improve citizen perceptions of the process. The premise, as
noted above, is intuitively quite straightforward: understanding the features
that citizens like (and dislike) in decision making processes is a potentially
important step in structuring decision making processes that are intended to
enhance the quality of governance by incorporating meaningful citizen
involvement.25

still only partially understood more than a century into the history of the regulatory state”).
24 Use of the procedural justice literature for a conceptual framework needs to be qualified,
for a variety of reasons. First, as is discussed infra Part III, this literature is by no means fully
developed or mature. Second, another part of the “justice” literature, which I leave for another
day, considers how different outcomes of decision making processes affect the level of citizen
satisfaction (the issue of “distributive justice”). Third, a range of social scientists are interested
in this issue of citizen satisfaction, from a variety of perspectives. See generally WHAT IS IT
ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18; James L. Gibson, et al., The Supreme Court and the US
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535,
539–45, 553 (2003), available at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~polisci/gibson/bjps2003.pdf
(discussing the possible relevance of factors such as “institutional loyalty” and “legitimizing
symbols”). These perspectives deserve consideration as part of any effort to enhance the
legitimacy of government decision making processes. Finally, a variety of factors may have
more effect than “procedural justice” in determining levels of citizen participation (such as
citizen expertise and resources, among others). See supra note 21; see also infra note 153.
25 Enhanced understanding of citizen preferences is only one such step in the effort to
enhance governance. I am not suggesting that citizen preferences should control the design of
governance institutions. The question of how much of a role citizens should play—how citizens’
perspectives and preferences should be balanced against other concerns—is for another time.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 14–15 (1990) (discussing Madison’s concerns about the “usurpation of government power
by well-organized groups with interests adverse to those of the public as a whole”). In recent
years, as NGOs have gained entrée into previously closed arenas, several commentators have
identified a variety of issues that are relevant in considering this issue, including the issue of
NGO accountability. Ann Florini, for example, has noted that many NGOs do not act in the
broader “public interest” and, moreover, effectively are unaccountable to society:
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Parts II and III of this Article provide contextual information about the
CEC. Part II provides an overview of the CEC including a brief history, a
summary of the purposes of the CEC citizen submissions process, and an
overview of the actual operation of the process. Part III reviews the track
record of the CEC citizen submissions process with a particular focus on
patterns of citizens’ use of the process. A key finding discussed in Part III is
that citizens’ use of the process in the United States has slowed dramatically.
Part IV reviews the procedural justice literature on citizen satisfaction
with decision making processes. This literature suggests that citizens’
assessments of the fairness of third-party decision making procedures is
important to judgments about the legitimacy of such processes, independent
of the outcomes of such procedures, a result that some have characterized
as “counterintuitive.” The procedural justice literature provides a framework
for considering the extent to which citizens are likely to judge particular
processes to be fair or just.
Part V contains an assessment of the citizen submissions process in the
context of the procedural justice literature, the track record of the CEC
process, and commentary about the process. This Part identifies various
features of the process that seem potentially to raise procedural justice
concerns. Part VI reinforces the potential value of empirically-based
research for the design and evaluation of processes of governance and
suggests additional research that will advance understanding of processes
that are intended to incorporate meaningful citizen involvement. The yield
from this effort, hopefully, will be to encourage greater consideration of
empirical work in the design and implementation of institutions of
governance,26 and, ultimately, to motivate creation of government decision

“[T]here is nothing inherent in the nature of civil society that ensures representation of a
broad public interest. The neo-Nazi hate groups that exchange repugnant rhetoric over
the Internet are just as much transnational civil society networks as are the human rights
coalitions. . . . [C]ivil society can seem disruptive, narrow-minded, and above all
unaccountable.”
ANN M. FLORINI, THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 231–32 (2000).
Florini notes that “to date, most NGOs have remained relatively immune to the growing
pressure for transparency on the part of governments and the private sector. . . . [T]o leave the
issue unaddressed is to threaten the long-term legitimacy of an important contributor to global
governance.” Id. at 233. Paul Posner identifies five generic problems that relate to
accountability challenges with third party tools, including goal diversion. Paul L. Posner,
Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE
TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 523, 528–32 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). Professor Ariel Armony
explores the “dark side” of civil society, and its potential to undermine democracy. See ARIEL C.
ARMONY, THE DUBIOUS LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 4 (2004). Armony argues,
inter alia, that:
“[C]ivil society does not necessarily promote the public interest or reforms that are
beneficial for the majority. . . . Smaller groups of participants with ample resources and
privileged access to decision-making spheres can impose narrow and parochial interests
on the public agenda and, as a result, impose unreasonable burdens on the broader
society.”

Id.
26

I am currently working with Professor Tom Tyler on a substantial follow-up project
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making processes that embody the lessons learned from such work and
hopefully prove more effective than current approaches in enhancing citizen
confidence in governance.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AND ITS
CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS27

A. An Overview of the CEC
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Environmental
Side Agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC),28 emerged from the NAFTA negotiations among the
three North American countries, Canada, Mexico, and the United States, to
liberalize trade throughout the continent.29 While proponents of NAFTA
touted it as the “‘greenest’ trade agreement ever,”30 skeptics and other
opponents were dubious.31 Some participants in the NAFTA debate pushed
involving several processes that are intended to encourage citizen participation.
27 I have previously written about the CEC and its citizen submissions process, and some of
the discussion in this section and in Part V is taken from that earlier work, particularly David L.
Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2000), David L. Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A

Review of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen
Submissions Process, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 759 (2005) [hereinafter Governance of
International Institutions], and David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process: On or
Off Course, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION, at 256 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) [hereinafter GREENING
NAFTA].
28 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 8–19,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
29 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057
[hereinafter NAFTA]. For book length treatments of the CEC, including discussion of its origins,
see, for example, PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996); GREENING NAFTA, supra
note 27. For analyses the CEC itself developed or commissioned, see, for example, TEN-YEAR
REV. & ASSESSMENT COMM., TEN YEARS OF NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
(2004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/PUBLICATIONS/TRAC-Report2004_en.pdf
[hereinafter TRAC]; ENVTL. L. INST., FINAL REPORT: ISSUES RELATED TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2003), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/ELI-Art14-15-Report-Final-5_en.pdf
[hereinafter
ISSUES
RELATED]; JOINT PUB. ADVISORY COMM., LESSONS LEARNED: CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS UNDER ARTICLES
14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, FINAL REPORT
TO THE COUNCIL OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/rep11-e-final_EN.PDF [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED];
INDEPENDENT REV. COMM., FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION: REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (1998),
available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/cfp3.cfm?varlan=english
[hereinafter FOUR-YEAR REVIEW].
30 Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization:
Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 318
(1997) (quoting former EPA Administrator William Reilly). See also JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra
note 29, at 121 (stating that NAFTA is “more attentive to environment-related concerns than are
most if not all the preceding trade agreements”).
31 Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Green Law or Green Spin?,
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for creation of an “environmental side agreement” that would create an
environmental commission that would focus on strengthening North
American environmental governance and protecting the North American
environment.32 There was considerable jockeying about the need for such an
institution and about its possible shape and powers.33 Ultimately, these
negotiations produced sufficient support for NAFTA to allow its passage,
accompanied by adoption of an “Environmental Side Agreement,” the
NAAEC.34
The NAAEC created a new international institution, the CEC. The CEC
has been termed a “brave experiment in institution-building.”35 Among other
things, the CEC: 1) is the “first of its kind in the world in linking
environmental cooperation with trade relations”,36 2) has “innovative tools
and almost unlimited jurisdiction” 37 to address “almost any environmental
issue anywhere in North America”,38 and 3) “provides unprecedented
opportunities for participation by civil society at the international level.”39
The CEC has three players: 1) a Council, comprised of the
environmental ministers of the three parties, 2) a Secretariat, essentially the
Commission’s staff, located primarily in Montreal, and 3) an innovative
independent advisory committee made up of five citizens from each of the
countries, known as the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).40 With the
important exception of the citizen submissions process, described below,41
and under some circumstances the article 13 process, the Council is
responsible for setting the agenda for the Commission.42 The Council
26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 68 (1994) (challenging the notion that NAFTA is the “greenest” free
trade agreement ever).
32 See Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 33–34
(1995) (stating that the CEC was the result of pressure from environmental groups who
recognized the ecological threat created by liberalized trade); TRAC, supra note 29, at 42
(noting that “the NAAEC was negotiated out of a concern that a Party’s lack of enforcement of
its environmental laws might provide it with an unfair competitive advantage”). The decision to
create an environmental side agreement split the environmental community. Some NGOs were
persuaded not to oppose the NAFTA package because of the inclusion of the environmental
agreement, while others continued to oppose NAFTA. See Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M.
Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement
Implemented, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 651, 675–81 (1998) [hereinafter Soft Teeth].
33 See DiMento & Doughman, supra note 32, at 667–74 (detailing the negotiations and
eventual agreement on the structure and functions of the CEC).
34 A labor agreement was adopted as well. North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
35 TRAC, supra note 29, at 4.
36 Id. at ix.
37 GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 2.
38 TRAC, supra note 29, at ix.
39 GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 2.
40 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 8–19. See John D. Wirth, Perspectives on The Joint Public
Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 199, 199 (highlighting the broad
mandate and substantial achievements of the JPAC).
41 See infra Part II.
42 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 10(1). The Secretariat also has some discretion under Article
13 of the NAAEC. Id. art. 13. For an assessment of one Secretariat article 13 report, see Dan
Tarlock & John E. Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro River Basin, in
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approves the annual work plan for the Commission and oversees the work
done to implement the work plan.43 The Secretariat develops the draft work
plan for Council approval44 and takes the lead on implementation of the
work plan.45 The JPAC is unique in making representatives of civil society
part of the governance structure of the CEC; it puts them on the inside.46 The
JPAC is authorized to provide advice to the Council on any matter within the
scope of the NAAEC and takes an active role in soliciting input on key issues
from interested North American stakeholders. 47
The CEC’s reach, and potential importance, transcends its NAFTA roots
and trade/environment origins. As John Knox and I have suggested
elsewhere, it represents an experiment in regional environmental
governance and should be of considerable interest to those interested in
cooperative efforts on environmental issues:
[T]he NAAEC and the CEC are much more than window dressing for NAFTA.
The NAAEC establishes the first regional environmental organization in North
America and gives it interesting, innovative mandates; it addresses
environmental issues related to economic integration in more detail than any
other agreement outside the European Union; and it provides new
opportunities for direct public participation in its implementation. In all of
these respects, the NAAEC offers lessons for other countries seeking to
address shared environmental problems against a backdrop of increasing
economic integration – which is to say, all countries.48

Moreover, given the increasing emphasis on “spotlighting” instruments,

49

GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 217–36.
43 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 10(1).
44 Id. art. 11(6).
45 See id. art. 11 (describing the Secretariat’s structure and procedures for carrying out its
technical, administrative, and operational support duties).
46 See id. art. 16; Janine Feretti, Innovations in Managing Globalization: Lessons from the
North American Experience, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (discussing the JPAC’s
creation as signaling the parties’ “commitment to public participation” and as an example of the
parties’ building the public’s role “into the structure of the Commission . . .”).
47 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 16(4); see Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., N. Am. Comm’n for
Envtl. Cooperation, Vision Statement, http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/vision/ (last visited
July 16, 2006) (“Our vision is to . . . ensure active public participation . . . in the actions of the
commission.”); Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., N. Am. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Assuring
Public
Participation
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/
FactSheet_EN%20fin.pdf (“Since 1994, the Committee has made several calls for public
comment on specific topics and has made important advice to Council and Secretariat,
contributing to the CEC’s work.”).
48 John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 9, 13.
49 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–26 (1999) (discussing “informational regulation,” that is,
regulation intended to promote effective implementation through relatively “soft,” non-coercive
approaches, rather than through conventional “command-and-control” strategies.) See generally
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT &
THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 59–83, 213–67 (2003) (discussing different strategies for
promoting environmental compliance).
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citizen participation in governance,50 and accountability mechanisms (and
government performance),51 the particular part of the CEC that is the focus
of this Article, its citizen submissions process, deserves particular attention
because it is an example of a spotlighting mechanism intended to facilitate
such participation and accountability (and improved performance).52 A 2004
report on the first ten years of the CEC’s operations concluded that “[t]he
CEC has successfully promoted citizen engagement on environmental issues
and increased government accountability regarding the enforcement of
environmental laws.”53 It suggests that the NAAEC “stands out for its
provisions for public participation and for the unprecedented commitment
by the three governments to account internationally for the enforcement of
their environmental laws.”54 It continues: “[t]hese provisions make the CEC
an international model for providing new avenues of public participation for
civil society.”55 The following section describes this innovative citizen
submissions process in more detail.

B. The CEC Citizen Submissions Process
The CEC’s JPAC has highlighted the importance of the CEC citizen
submissions process as a possible model for enhancing public oversight of
government enforcement efforts:
In preparing this Report, we have been conscious of the importance of the
Articles 14 and 15 submission process as a vehicle for public oversight of the
enforcement of environmental laws by the Parties to the [NAFTA] and as a
possible model for similar efforts under other trade agreements within the
Americas and the world.56

A variety of commentators have echoed this sentiment. As one commentator
has suggested, “[t]he Citizen’s Submission Process [is] perhaps the most
important function of the Secretariat of the CEC, and definitely the one that
has captured the most attention of environmental groups, the private sector,

50

See infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005).
51

52 The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has characterized the process as “[b]y far the
most innovative and substantial mechanism created within the NAAEC for fostering
transparency and public participation.” ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 4.
53 TRAC, supra note 29, at x.
54 Id. at 4.
55 Id. See infra Part III.
56 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 2. The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has
characterized the process as “[b]y far the most innovative and substantial mechanism created
within the NAAEC for fostering transparency and public participation.” ISSUES RELATED, supra
note 29, at 4; see also TRAC, supra note 29, at 42, 43 (“One of the key mechanisms the NAAEC
created to meets its objective of enhancing compliance with, and enforcement of,
environmental laws and regulations is the citizen submission process . . . . This mechanism is
the NAAEC’s most innovative and most controversial.”). The TRAC report also quotes a JPAC
Advice that the process plays a “unique and indispensable role in fostering vigorous
environmental enforcement,” and a NAC Advice that it is a “cornerstone of the [NAAEC].” Id.
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and legal specialists . . . in NAEEC’s article 14 and 15.”57 Chris Wold, the
principal author of the one U.S. submission to result in a CEC factual
record,58 notes that “[m]any had regarded the Citizen Submission Process as
a potential model for accountability and governance for a new breed of
international institutions—a positive response to globalization that gives
citizens a voice in the often impenetrable affairs of international
organizations.”59
The hope was that this citizen spotlighting mechanism would invigorate
the domestic environmental enforcement practices of Canada, Mexico, and
the United States, which would lead to improved compliance and higher
levels of environmental protection.60 In short, the process was intended to
be an important feature of the countries’ efforts to bolster domestic
governance capacity in response to concerns that the liberalized trade made
possible by NAFTA would increase pressures on domestic governments
because of “race to the bottom,” scale, and other possible effects of
expanding trade.61

57 Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA up to its Green Expectations? Effective Law Enforcement
Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1591,

1596 (1999).
58 Chris Wold, et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 415, 416 (2004).
59 Id. Wold also noted that “[c]itizens had strongly supported the Citizen Submission
Process and played an active role in supporting and employing the mechanism.” Id. at 416. See
also Randy Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA: Observations after 10
Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 165 (2004) (noting that the citizen submission process has been an
effective means of “highlighting environmental problems, compelling governments to engage in
debates, and bringing about positive environmental change through independent factual
investigations”). Mr. Christensen, a lawyer with the Canadian Sierra Legal Defense Fund
(SLDF), probably has as much experience with the CEC process as any U.S. or Canadian NGO,
having served as legal counsel on three submissions that have proceeded to factual records. Id.
at 166 n.1. There were clearly some skeptics as well and, indeed, significant elements of the
environmental community continued to oppose NAFTA despite the commitment to create the
NAAEC and establish the CEC. See, e.g., Mary E. Kelly, NAFTA’s Environmental Side
Agreement: A Review and Analysis, (Tex. Ctr. for Pol’y Stud., Austin, Tex.), 1993, at (pt. 2),
available at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-099/008-099ii.html (suggesting that “the non-binding,
virtually advisory role of most CEC reports and recommendations [undermine] the value of
having such a broad scope of issues come under the CEC”).
60 David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight Process, ENVTL. F., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 33; see John
H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The
Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 23 (2001)
(noting that “Mexico’s environmental laws were essentially equivalent to those of the United
States and . . . the problem was inadequate compliance with those laws.” As a result, the United
States and other NGOs that were the driving forces behind the creation of the CEC and its
citizen submission mechanism, sought a mechanism that would focus on bolstering domestic
enforcement capacity. While the objective was to bolster such capacity across the continent,
there was particular interest in a mechanism that would invigorate Mexican enforcement.). In
its June 1998 report, the Independent Review Committee (IRC) suggests that the process
“feed[s] into the Council’s responsibility to promote high environmental standards and their
enforcement, and to prevent a race to the bottom from occurring.” FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra
note 29, at 8. In the IRC’s view, the process provides “some 350 million pairs of eyes to alert the
Council of any ‘race to the bottom’ through lax environmental enforcement.” Id. at 17.
61 See Greg M. Block, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation and
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There are three main actors in the citizen submissions process: the CEC
Council;62 interested citizens (“civil society”);63 and a Secretariat.64 In
creating the process, the parties assigned a substantial role to citizens of the
three North American countries. The NAAEC empowers citizens to start the
spotlighting process and, thereby, influence where the spotlight will shine
(the process is launched with the filing of a citizen complaint called a
submission).65 In addition, the NAAEC empowers citizens to contribute
information about the nature and effectiveness of the government
enforcement practices at issue in particular submissions.66
The NAAEC vests in the CEC Secretariat considerable authority over
administration of the process. Under the NAAEC’s division of
responsibilities, it is the Secretariat’s job to conduct the initial review of a
submission and decide, based on a variety of factors contained in NAAEC
article 14(1) and (2), whether to reject the submission or to ask the targeted
country for a response.67 Article 14(2)(b), for example, directs the
Secretariat to consider whether the submission “raises matters whose
further study in [the citizen submissions] process would advance the goals
of this Agreement.”68 If the Secretariat determines that a submission does
not warrant further review, based on the Secretariat’s consideration of the
submission in light of the article 14(1) and (2) factors, the Secretariat may
unilaterally dismiss the submission.69
For submissions that survive the Secretariat’s article 14(1) and (2)
filtering process, it is the Secretariat’s responsibility both to request a
response from the party whose enforcement efforts are the focus of the
submission, and to review the submission in light of any such response.70
The Secretariat then determines whether to notify the Council that, in the
Secretariat’s view, it would be appropriate under the NAAEC to prepare a

the Environmental Effects of NAFTA: A Decade of Lessons Learned and Where They Leave Us,
26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 451 (2004) (examining the effects of trade liberalization
on environmental expenditures); Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 395 (2004) (noting that “[m]any environmentalists believe
that trade liberalization undermines environmental protection not only in terms of a race to the
bottom in regulatory standards, but also in a race-to-the-bottom in implementation and
enforcement”).
62 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 8–19.
63
64

Id.

NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 11–15. The TRAC Report characterizes the Secretariat as
“unique among intergovernmental organizations in the combination of its traditional service
role to the governments that created it with responsibilities where the Secretariat has certain
autonomy (Articles 13 to 15).” TRAC, supra note 29, at 32. A former CEC Executive Director has
stated that there is a “significant natural tension between the Secretariat and the parties”
because of the independent authority of the Secretariat. Feretti, supra note 46, at 369. The Joint
Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) has also played in important role in the citizen submissions
process. See Wirth, supra note 40, at 199 (discussing the JPAC’s role in the CEC).
65 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14.
66 Id. art. 15.
67 Id. art. 14.
68 Id. art. 14(2)(b).
69 See infra notes 200–02 and accompanying text (discussing the Secretariat’s track record
in performing this responsibility).
70 NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 14(2), 15(1).
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“factual record.”71 The Secretariat may unilaterally dismiss a submission at
this stage if it determines that a factual record is not warranted. 72 In either
case—a recommendation to proceed with a factual record or a dismissal—
the Secretariat must explain the rationale for its decision.73
If the Council directs the Secretariat to go forward with the
development of a factual record, the Secretariat has the opportunity and
responsibility to develop information relating to the allegations in the
submission of a failure to effectively enforce and then to prepare a draft
factual record that contains the results of its investigative work. Article
15(4) of the Agreement authorizes the Secretariat to consider “any relevant
technical, scientific or other information” that is: 1) “publicly available”, 2)
“submitted by interested non-governmental organizations or persons”, 3)
submitted by the JPAC, or 4) “developed by the Secretariat or by
independent experts.”74 The Agreement also specifies that the Secretariat
shall consider any information provided by a party.75 Another provision in
the NAAEC, article 21, gives the Secretariat authority to obtain information
from the parties,76 and article 11(4) forbids unilateral party efforts to
influence the Secretariat in the performance of its responsibilities.77 Thus,
the Agreement appears to give the Secretariat broad discretion to obtain
information about the enforcement practices that are the focus of the
submission, including hiring experts to assist it and requesting information
from the country involved.
Finally, after developing a draft factual record and submitting it to the
Council for comments,78 the Secretariat has discretion to develop a final
factual record, incorporating any party comments only to the extent the
Secretariat deems appropriate.79
While the NAAEC gives considerable authority to citizen submitters
(including the power to trigger the process and thereby to determine on
what enforcement practices the spotlighting mechanism will shine), and to
the Secretariat to administer the process, it is also clear that, in creating the
CEC, the parties vested considerable power in the Council, reflecting their
intention to retain an important role in the implementation of the citizen

71 Id. art. 15(1). Factual records are the endpoint of the citizen submission process and
provide information about the nature of the party’s enforcement practices at issue and about
the effectiveness of those enforcement practices.
72 Id. Council Res. 99-06, at 9.6, C.E.C. Doc. C/99-00/RES/07/Rev.3 (June 28, 1999),
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide_submit/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited July 16, 2006)
[hereinafter Guidelines for Submissions] (“If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in
light of any response provide by the Party, does not warrant development of a factual
record, . . . the submission process is terminated with respect to that submission.”). The NAAEC
requires the Secretariat to terminate a submission that focuses on a matter that is the subject of
a pending judicial or administrative proceeding. NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(3)(a).
73 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(1) (recommendation to proceed with a factual record);
Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 9.6.
74 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(4).
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 11(4).
Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 15(5)–(6).

2006]

UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES

665

submissions process.80 As suggested above, the process creates specific
“checks” that the Council may exercise at particular stages in the citizen
submissions process. Thus, the NAAEC gives the Council a “check” on
submissions for which the Secretariat believes development of a factual
record is warranted. Instead of allowing the Secretariat unilaterally to
determine to proceed with the preparation of a factual record, the parties
reserve in the Council authority to terminate a submission at this stage.81
The NAAEC requires that the Secretariat recommend preparation of a
factual record to the Council and it empowers the Council to decide, after it
reviews the Secretariat’s Recommendation, whether to dismiss the
submission or direct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.82
The process creates two additional party “checks” on the Secretariat’s
authority, both following the Secretariat’s preparation of a draft factual
record. First, the NAAEC requires that the Secretariat submit draft factual
records to the Council, and it authorizes each party to provide comments to
the Secretariat on the draft (important limitations on these party “checks”
are that parties’ comments must be confined to the “accuracy” of the draft,
and the Secretariat need only take such comments into account, when the
Secretariat deems appropriate, but it is not obligated to incorporate them).83
The parties’ other “check” is that the Council retains control over public
release of final factual records.84 The Secretariat must submit each final
factual record to the Council, and it is up to the Council to determine
whether to release it to the public.85
III. THE TRACK RECORD OF CITIZENS’ USE OF THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS
PROCESS
As noted above, citizens initiate the citizen submissions process by
filing a “submission” in which they allege that a party is failing to effectively
enforce one or more of its environmental laws.86 This is potentially an
important, indeed unique, opportunity for citizens to direct a spotlight onto
government enforcement practices that citizens believe are inadequate.87
The track record of citizens’ use of the process is likely to be a helpful signal
of the process’s prospects for success. A “spotlighting” mechanism that is
not being used is likely not as effective as it might be. In contrast,
substantial, and increasing, use of the process would be a strong (though,
obviously not dispositive) signal of a vibrant, successful mechanism. Thus,
the extent of citizens’ use of a citizen-driven spotlighting process such as the
80
81

See Markell, Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 769–80.
NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(2). (“The Secretariat shall prepare a factual record if the

Council, by a two-thirds vote, instructs it to do so.”) (emphasis added). The parties structured
the process to prevent the Party that is the focus of the submission from unilaterally
terminating the process by allowing Council approvals by majority vote, rather than by
consensus.
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id. art. 15(5)–15(6).
Id.
Id.
NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14.
LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 2.
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citizen submissions process is a potentially useful benchmark for assessing
its possible utility or value.88 This Part reviews the track record of citizen use
of the process.

A. Overall Use of the Process
In its 2001 Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and
15, JPAC puts a positive gloss on the extent of citizens’ use of the citizen
submissions process.89 It notes that “[c]itizen [s]ubmissions [p]lay an
[e]ssential [r]ole in [a]chieving the [g]oals of the NAAEC. . . . NGOs from the
NAAEC countries have repeatedly turned to the articles 14 and 15 process
when they believed that domestic environmental remedies were not
adequate to address their complaints.”90 On the other hand, some
commentators have been less impressed with the level of citizen use of the
process.91
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive review of use of the citizen
submissions process. It shows that, as of December 31, 2005, citizens have
filed a total of fifty-two submissions since inception of the CEC in 1994.
9

Numberof Submissions

8
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(0)
(2)
(4)
(8)
(6)
(2)
(6)
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(6)
(7)
(3)
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Figure 1. Citizen Submissions Process: Annual Submissions (Through

December 31, 2005)92

88 There are other signals or indicators of success or failure as well. Some are intrinsic to
the process, such as the significance of the practices that are spotlighted. Others are extrinsic,
such as the need for the mechanism in light of the alternatives, the level of concern about
government enforcement, resources, other priorities, and the like. See infra Part IV.
89 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 13–14.
90 Id. at 10, 13 (noting that the Secretariat needs additional resources to administer the
process because of the workload).
91 See Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 27, at 256–57; TRAC, supra note 29, at 43 (indicating that the CEC has
“received far fewer submissions than initially anticipated”).
92 Figure 1 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
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Submissions work out to 4.33 per year over this 12-year period. If one
were to start the clock from the beginning of 1995, the year in which the first
submission was filed, the average is 4.7 submissions per year (52 divided by
11). Thus, regardless of whether one begins counting submissions at the
time the citizen submissions process was first available for business, or
whether one waits a year to give the process a chance to become better
known, the total of fifty-two submissions translates into between four or five
submissions per year.
The other feature of this record that seems to be potentially relevant to
use is the question of trends in use over time. Has the process experienced a
significant increase or decrease in its use since its inception? A significant
increase seemingly would suggest a vital process that is perceived to be
useful. A significant decrease seemingly would portend a process that is not
perceived to have sufficient promise or value to warrant use.
As Figure 1 reflects, here the record is not particularly clear. During the
first six years of the process, from 1994–1999, a total of twenty-two
submissions were filed. During the past six years, a total of thirty
submissions have been filed. This track record suggests that the process is
experiencing an increase in use. One qualification, however, is that the
picture of a trend of increasing submissions is much less clear if one
discounts the start-up year (1994, when no submissions were filed). That is,
if one begins with 1995, a total of twenty-eight submissions were filed during
the initial six year period (from 1995-2000), while twenty-four have been
filed during the more recent five year period. As a result, unless there are an
unprecedented number of submissions in 2006, the distribution of
submissions between the first and second six year periods is likely to be
relatively equal. In short, viewed on its own, the track record appears to
reflect a pattern of relatively stable use, with moderate ebbs and flows
annually, rather than a significant increase or decrease in use over time.
In addition to reviewing the track record of the CEC process on its own,
it also may be helpful to evaluate this record by comparing it with other
citizen-driven mechanisms. There are two citizen-driven processes under the
suite of NAFTA Agreements besides the CEC citizen submissions process:
the citizen submissions mechanism created under the Labor Side
Agreement,93 and the investor provision created under NAFTA itself.94 These
would seem to be natural points of possible comparison for the CEC
process, although the processes are by no means identical and other salient
differences may exist as well.
The Labor Side Agreement, like the NAAEC, allows NGOs to file
petitions. Under the NAALC, the petitions are filed with National
Administrative Offices (NAO), bodies that are set up as agencies within the

COOPERATION, ARTICLE 14 SUBMISSION ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS: PROCESS STATUS AS OF 27
JANUARY 2006 (2006) (on file with author). The Secretariat develops these status updates
periodically and makes them available to the public. As a general matter, I am especially
indebted to Damian Zimmerman, J.D. expected 2007, Florida State University College of Law,
for his work in development of the tables and figures in this article.
93 NAALC, supra note 34 arts. 27–41.
94 NAFTA, supra note 29, ch. 11.
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labor department of each member state.95 In other words, they are not
independent of the member governments to which they belong. There have
been a total of thirty-two submissions since inception of the process in 1994,
as Figure 2 reflects.
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Year

Figure 2: NAALC Labor Agreement Annual NAO Submissions (Through

December 31, 2005) 96
These figures suggest at least two salient facts in terms of the Labor
process’s relevance as a possible point of comparison for the CEC citizen
submissions process. First, the environmental citizen submissions process
has experienced much more use than the Labor Agreement process: only
61.5% as many submissions have been filed under the latter as under the
former. Further, the Labor Agreement statistics reflect a significant decline
in use over the past several years. During the first six years of its operation,
a total of twenty-two submissions were filed, while only ten have been filed
during the past six years. Thus, two-thirds of the submissions were filed
during the first six years, and only one-third over the past five. In short, in
terms of total use and trends in use, the CEC process appears to be much
more vibrant than does the Labor Agreement process.97

95 See NAALC, supra note 34, art. 15 (requiring each party to treaty to establish National
Administrative Office at the federal government level); Jonathan Graubart, “Politicizing” a New

Breed of “Legalized” Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of
NAFTA’s Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 99 (2005) (noting that
while the NAOs can accept petitions, they “cannot order changes in state or company behavior
nor issue sanctions”).
96 Figure 2 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department of Labor. U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm (last visited July 16, 2006).
97 Another key point concerning the labor process involves the spike in use in 1998. During
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Chapter 11 of NAFTA98 includes a variety of provisions that are
intended to protect foreign direct investment, by North American investors,
in other North American countries. It establishes that, for instance,
government measures should not discriminate between foreign and
domestic investors;99 it is intended to assure a “minimum standard” of “fair
and equitable” treatment for foreign investors,100 and it limits expropriation
or any measure “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation.”101
Investors are empowered to seek relief through binding international
arbitration.102 Investors have filed a total of twenty-seven cases under
chapter 11 since NAFTA entered into force in 1994, as Figure 3 reflects.
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Figure 3: NAFTA Chapter 11: Annual Submissions (Through December

31, 2005)103

that year ten submissions were filed, while no more than four have been filed any other year.
Professor Graubart recently has suggested that “some past petitioners [are] ready to write off
the [NAALC] process altogether.” Graubart, supra note 95, at 98. He suggests that “[s]hifts in the
broader political context affect the value” of mechanisms like the NAALC, and that the
reduction in perceived value of the NAALC process is attributable to a less supportive U.S.
Administration, and a Mexican President who is less vulnerable to shaming campaigns. Id. at
101. He concludes that a “deteriorating political climate guts the political value of quasi-judicial,
nonbinding mechanisms.” Id. at 121. Graubart suggests, however, that the process has “proven
its political worth” through the changes it has engendered, and that the NAALC is “likely to
regain value when political circumstances turn favorable again.” Id. at 101, 140.
98 NAFTA, supra note 29 at 639–49.
99 Id. at 639.
100

Id.
Id. at 640.
102 Id. at 643; see Sanford E. Gaines, Protecting Investors, Protecting the Environment: The
Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 27, at 173, 174–77
101

(providing an overview of Chapter 11 of NAFTA).
103 Figure 3 was developed using data released by the U.S. Department of State. U.S. Dep’t of
State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited July
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In terms of the possible salience of the NAFTA chapter 11 experience
for assessing the track record of the CEC citizen submissions process, over
the same period of time the CEC process has received much more citizen
use than has the NAFTA chapter 11 process. The latter has experienced 52%
or a little more than half as many submissions. The figure reflects that after
the first three years (during which no petitions were filed), use has been
relatively stable.104

16, 2006). The data reflect the number of NAFTA chapter 11 investor-state disputes submitted
for arbitration from 1994 through December 31, 2005. The Waste Management, Inc. v. United
Mexican States claim filed in 1998, first rejected by a tribunal on procedural grounds and then
later refiled, is treated as one claim. Similarly, the more than 100 claims listed as Cases
Regarding the Border Closing due to BSE Concerns are treated as one claim.
104 NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, supra note 103. Other citizen-driven mechanisms
were created by international institutions at about the same time as the NAAEC citizen
submissions process was established. The World Bank’s inspection panel, created in 1993,
allows people directly and adversely affected by a proposed bank project to claim that the Bank
failed to follow its own operational policies and procedures during the design, appraisal, and/or
implementation of a Bank-financed project . Since 1993, the World Bank Inspection Panel has
received a total of 34 requests, or about two-thirds as many as the number of CEC submissions.
There has been a significant decline in submissions to the Inspection Panel over the second half
of its existence. While there were 20 submissions during the first six years (from 1994–1999),
there have only been 14 over the past six years (2000–2005). See Daniel D. Bradlow, Private

Complaints and International Organizations: A Comparative Study of the Independent
Inspection Mechanisms in International Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 403, 411–20
(2005) (discussing the World Bank Inspection Panel). Significant differences in the mechanisms
may account for these differences in track record, such as their jurisdictional scope, and
standing to bring a claim. The World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. No. 93-10, World Bank (Sept.
22, 1993), reprinted in World Bank Inspection Panel, Operating Procedures Annex 1 (1994),
available at http://web.worldbank.org/ (follow “index” hyperlink; then follow “Inspection Panel”
hyperlink; then follow “Policies and Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “Operating Procedure –
English”). Several other international financial institutions have established inspection
mechanisms since the Bank did so in 1993. Bradlow, supra, at 409. Further, the European Union
created the European Ombudsman in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to investigate complaints of
maladministration in the European Union governing bodies. Any citizen of the Union or any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state can lodge a
complaint with the Ombudsman. Use of this process has been significantly greater than use of
any of the NAFTA-created processes, including the CEC process and also significantly greater
than use of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, and use has increased dramatically since
inception of the process. See Bradlow, supra, at 449–53 (discussing the European Ombudsman).
The citizen submissions process created in the 1997 Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation provides another basis for comparison. This process has received only four
submissions to date, none since 2002. None of the submissions resulted in a factual record.
Canadian Nat’l Secretariat, Canada-Chile Agreement on Envtl. Cooperation Submissions
Registry, http://www.can-chil.gc.ca/English/Profile/JSC/Registry/Registry.cfm (last visited July
16, 2006).
In addition, domestic mechanisms exist as well. In the United States, for example, citizens
have a broad range of potential mechanisms for raising concerns about performance, including
citizen suits under statutory law against violators, citizen suits against government agencies for
not performing non-discretionary acts, common law actions, and the opportunity to participate
in various ways in government enforcement and permitting actions. Professor Jim May reports
that the trend is toward more citizen suit activity, indicating that since 1995, citizens have filed
about one lawsuit each week and submitted more than 4,500 notices of intent to sue, which
translates to about two notices of intent to sue each business day. James R. May, Now More
Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4 (2003). Use of
this domestic mechanism obviously dwarfs use of the CEC process over the past decade.
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What insights, if any, should we glean from the CEC’s track record,
when viewed independently, and relative to other citizen-driven mechanisms
created around the same time? While comparative analysis of different
institutions with different structures, powers, and constituencies should
obviously be done with considerable caution,105 such an analysis shows that
overall use of the CEC process (between four and five submissions per year)
is not out of line with the other NAFTA citizen-driven institutions. If
anything, there has been greater recourse to the CEC mechanism than to the
others.
Trends in use of the CEC mechanism are not particularly clear. There
has been an ebb and flow in use of the CEC process, but there has not been
a significant increase or decrease in overall use, if one compares the early
years of the process and the more recent period. The CEC process, again,
does not seem to be following the trend lines of the NAALC process; instead,
its track record in terms of use is more similar to that of the NAFTA chapter
11 process. It is unclear, at this point, how use of the CEC process will
evolve over time, including whether the CEC process is experiencing a long
gestation period before it “takes off,” or whether use will remain relatively
stable or decline in the future.106

B. A More Nuanced Review of the CEC Track Record
A more detailed analysis of the track record of citizens’ use of the CEC
process tells a potentially different story than the seemingly unsettled
picture one might glean from the numbers reviewed in the preceding
section. In particular, a look at the number of submissions disaggregated
based on the country targeted reveals trends in use that suggest that citizens
have not embraced the process as a viable mechanism for raising concerns
about U.S. enforcement; indeed, for the past few years they seem to have
virtually abandoned it for this purpose.
Table 1 provides a more detailed breakdown of citizen submissions
than Figure 1 above, by reviewing the distribution of submissions by country
involved. It shows that, overall, of the fifty-two total submissions, nine have
involved the United States, seventeen have involved Canada, and twenty-six
have involved Mexico.

105 See John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements on Labor and the
Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 359, 379 (2004).
106 In his review of the track records of the NAAEC and NAALC processes, John Knox
concludes that the CEC procedure is more effective, in part because citizens have continued to
use it. He “urg[ed] labor and environmental advocates to recognize the relative success of the
NAAEC and [to] work to build on its provisions.” Id. at 360.
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Table 1: Distribution of Submissions by Country (Through December

31, 2005) 107
On the one hand, it is not necessarily surprising that Mexico would be
the target of more submissions than Canada or the United States. One
reason the NAAEC focuses on environmental enforcement, and includes a
mechanism that focuses on enforcement failures, is that there was concern
that Mexican enforcement was inadequate, and that international scrutiny
might be a useful strategy to bolster it.108 Thus, some might suggest that the
distribution of filings reflects that the process is working as intended. In
other words, the process originally was created in part because of concerns
about Mexican enforcement, so it is consistent with that original conception
for submissions to disproportionately target Mexico.
Beyond differences in the enforcement performance of the respective
domestic governments, there also may be good reasons for this disparity.
For example, significant differences in the availability of domestic tools for
citizens to challenge government performance and/or to take action on their
own to address inadequate enforcement may well be important factors
underlying the disparity in submissions across countries.109

107 Table 1 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, supra note 92.
108 See, e.g., Knox, supra note 60, at 23.
109 See, e.g., Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms, supra note 61, at 412 (stating that “the
disparity in citizen submissions probably reflects the existence of better alternatives in U.S.
domestic law”); Christensen, supra note 59, at 171 (stating that a “common explanation given
for the low usage of the citizen submission process in the United States is the wide availability
of domestic enforcement mechanisms”); Randy E. Brogdon & Mack McGuffey, Recent Trends in
CAA Citizen Suits: Managing Risk in the Serengeti, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 17, 17–21
(Winter 2006) (offering reasons why domestic citizen suits in the United States under the Clean
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On the other hand, the disparity is arguably significant given the
populations of each country—the United States, which has by far the fewest
submissions, has by far the largest population, estimated at 297,914,453.110 In
comparison, as of July, 2006, Canada’s estimated population is 33,098,932,111
and Mexico’s estimated population is 107,449,525.112 As Professor Kal
Raustiala has pointed out, “[o]n a per capita basis, complaints against
Canada are more than 1400% higher and complaints against Mexico more
than 700% higher than complaints against the United States. The United
States, with nearly ten times the population of Canada, has fewer
submissions filed against it than Canada has even in absolute terms.”113
The more significant finding concerning the track record of citizen use
of the citizen submissions process relates to trends in use, rather than to the
overall use of the process depicted above. In particular, there has been a
significant change in use of the process in recent years in terms of the
countries citizens are targeting. Table 2 reviews use of the process during its
first six years, roughly the first half of its existence. There were a total of
twenty-eight submissions during this period, a little more than half of the
fifty-two filed to date. Table 2 shows that the distribution of submissions by
country during this initial six year period was relatively uniform or balanced.
Of the twenty-eight submissions, eight were filed against the United States
(29%), nine were filed against Canada (32%), and eleven were filed against
Mexico (39%).

Air Act and domestic common law actions may be increasingly popular).
110 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. POPULATION CLOCK FOR JAN. 16, 2006, http://factfinder.
census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en (last visited July 16, 2006).
111 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, CANADA, http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html#People (last visited July 16, 2006) (reporting the most
current Canadian census information).
112 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, MEXICO, http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#People (last visited July 16, 2006) (reporting the most
current Mexican census information).
113 Raustiala, supra note 61, at 412.
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Table 2: Distribution of Submissions by Country 1994-2000 (Total

Submissions 1994-2000)114
Table 3 shows that the distribution of submissions has changed
dramatically during the most recent five year period, from 2001-2005. Table 3
reflects that of the twenty-four submissions filed during this period; only one
has involved the United States (4%). Eight submissions have involved
Canada (33%), while Mexico is the target of fifteen of the last twenty-four
submissions (62.5%). In short, submissions involving the United States have
effectively dried up.

114 Table 2 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, supra note 92.
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Table 3: Distribution of Submissions by Country 2001-2005 (Total

Submissions 2001-2005)115
This precipitous decline in U.S. submissions raises a host of issues. For
purposes of this Article, the question is whether implementation of the
process has led to citizen dissatisfaction for reasons suggested by the
procedural justice literature, which in turn has caused citizens virtually to
abandon the process for the United States.116 And, the obvious follow-up
question: to the extent that implementation of the process has been
unsatisfactory to citizens (and this may have led to a decision to limit use of
the process to challenge U.S. enforcement), is it possible to identify features
of the process that have been particularly problematic and to develop fixes
that will ameliorate concerns? 117
There is some evidence that U.S. submitters (and prospective
submitters) have been frustrated with implementation of the process, in
terms of submissions challenging U.S. enforcement. Jay Tuchton, an early
115 Table 3 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, supra note 92. The totals above reflect the name of the member country listed as
the “Party Concerned” in each submission.
116 The distribution of submissions also raises questions concerning whether outcome-based
factors or factors independent of the process are contributing to changes in distribution of use,
including, for example, changes in priorities after September 11th or other developments,
availability of reduced resources, availability of domestic mechanisms, greater comfort with
government enforcement (unlikely in my view), or heightened skepticism concerning the
efficacy of “shaming” mechanisms in the current political climate. See Graubart, supra note 95,
at 137–40 (discussing the changes in the political climate and subsequent shifts in the NAALC
petition process).
117 A concern has been raised that the distribution of submissions raises geopolitical issues
concerning the possible effect of this trend on Mexico’s commitment to the process if the trend
continues. If the trend continues, Mexico’s commitment to the process might become an issue.
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U.S. submitter who challenged U.S. practices, for example, criticized the
process because of what he believed to be the Secretariat’s overly narrow
interpretation of the scope of the process, which he suggested substantially
reduced its value.118 There is considerable anecdotal evidence that Council
actions in overseeing and implementing the process have triggered
significant citizen dissatisfaction. The 2004 TRAC Report, for example, has
the following to say about the impact of Council actions on U.S. NGO
support for the CEC:
[T]he CEC has less support than could have been anticipated among its major
stakeholder groups (NGOs, business, academia) in the United States for a
variety of reasons. The interest of US NGOs has declined. . . . US NGO
dissatisfaction with what they see as the Council weakening the citizens’
submission process . . . has contributed to this detachment.119

Part V provides a more detailed review of citizen satisfaction
concerning implementation of the process. First, though, this Article lays the
groundwork for considering this question by reviewing the psychology
literature on satisfaction in order to provide a tentative framework for
considering citizen perspectives.

118 Jay Tuchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA’s Environmental Side
Agreement: It’s Easy to Use, but Does it Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,031, 10,031 (1996). Most

other commentators have given the Secretariat high marks for its decisions concerning these
submissions. See infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text. A related point is that the lack of
submissions involving U.S. practices does not mean that U.S. NGOs have abandoned the
process. Of the 24 submissions filed since 2000, a few that focus on Canadian or Mexican
enforcement include U.S. individuals and/or NGOs as co-submitters. See, e.g., Ontario Power
Generation (SEM-03-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/03-001/22/14(1)(2) (Aug. 14, 2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/03-1-DET%2014_1__2__en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006)
(discussing Canada’s failure to effectively enforce the Canadian Environmental Protection Act
and the Federal Fisheries Act against the Ontario Power Generations coal-fired plant); Ontario
Logging (SEM-02-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 4, 2002), http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/03-1-DET%2014_1__2__en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (discussing Canada’s
alleged failure to effectively enforce subsection 6(a) of the Migratory Birds Regulations against
the logging industry in Ontario); Montreal Technoparc (SEM-03-005), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/03005/12/14(1)(2) (Aug. 14, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/03-5-DET14_1_2_en.pdf (last
visited July 16, 2006) (discussing Canada’s alleged failure to effectively enforce section 36(3) of
the Fisheries Act in connection to alleged discharges of pollutants into the St. Lawrence River);
Coronado Islands (SEM-05-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/05-002 (May 2, 2005), http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/sem/05-2-SUB_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (discussing a submission regarding a
finding that Mexico failed to effectively enforce its environmental law within the meaning of
NAAEC by allowing the construction of a liquefied natural gas re-gasification terminal adjacent
to an environmentally sensitive area).
119 TRAC, supra note 29, at 40. The TRAC Report continues: “Canadian and Mexican NGOs,
however, have valued the increased transparency that the citizens’ submission process has
brought to specific issues in each of these countries.” Id.
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IV. USING THE LITERATURE ON “PROCEDURAL JUSTICE” AS A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK
FOR CONSIDERING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT DECISION
MAKING PROCESSES, INCLUDING THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS
As discussed above,120 numerous scholars have argued that trust in
government, and in institutions of governance, is indispensable for the
continuing legitimacy of the state. The conventional wisdom, unfortunately,
is that we are operating “against the backdrop of fifty years of declining
legitimacy for legal and political authorities. People are less willing to trust
political and legal authorities than in the past.”121 Even if this were not the
case, it is still worthwhile to understand the extent to which government
institutions are operating in ways that increase or diminish levels of citizen
trust or confidence. The purpose of this Part is to explore the beginnings of a
possible framework for assessing citizen satisfaction with institutions of
governance, including government decision making processes intended to
promote meaningful public participation.122 This framework is drawn from
the social science literature on “procedural justice.”123
The question of how best to evaluate decision making processes based
on their “legitimacy” is not an easy one to answer.124 Intuitively, one might
think that outcomes of decision making processes are the variable most
likely to influence perceptions of participants and others about the
legitimacy of such processes. It might be expected, in other words, that
results will be determinative. To borrow from the psychology literature,
because the “instrumental orientation of social-psychological models of the
person . . . view[s] people as wanting to maximize the resources they gain in
interactions with others,”125 good results will engender increased confidence
while adverse results will lead to diminished trust.
The psychology literature, however, suggests a result that some have
characterized as “counterintuitive,” notably that the extent to which a
process is “procedurally just” is extremely important to judgments about its
legitimacy.126 While it may be “difficult to believe that people will find a
negative or undesirable outcome more acceptable simply because of the

120
121

See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text.

TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 85 (1997). See also Cross, supra
note 18, at 1457–60.
122 As noted supra, citizen satisfaction is not the only factor that should be considered in
designing such processes.
123 One leading commentator defines “procedural justice” to involve participants’
satisfaction with decision making processes. Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 121
(1988). See also Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done With Equity Theory? New
Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH at 27, 39 (Gerold Mikula ed., 1980) (“[A] justice rule is defined as a belief
that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria. This type of justice rule is
referred to as a procedural rule, to distinguish it from distribution rules.”).
124 See supra notes 7–18 and accompanying text.
125 TYLER, supra note 121, at 76.
126 See Tyler, supra note 123, at 108–10 (examining procedural justice in the context of
citizen experiences with police and courts).
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manner in which it was arrived,”127 the psychology literature on procedural
justice suggests that is the case. A key insight from this literature, in short, is
that legitimacy should not be assessed solely on the basis of the
distributional implications of decision making processes—i.e., based on the
fairness or justice of the outcomes different types of processes are likely to
yield. Instead, outcome favorability and fairness are not identical—citizens
clearly make distinct fairness judgments—and the extent to which a
decision making process is “procedurally just” is an important factor in
assessing the legitimacy of such process.128 As Tom Tyler has put it, “the
expanded model [of social justice] recognizes that people are concerned
about how decisions are made as well as about what those decisions
are”129—the distinction between substantive and procedural justice.
Evaluations of the fairness of the procedures by which outcomes are
determined have been labeled “judgments of procedural justice.”130
Thibaut and Walker undertook the first systematic psychological
research program to try to demonstrate the importance of procedural justice
in the 1970s.131 They hypothesized that a person’s evaluation of the fairness
of decision making procedures influences his reaction to the outcomes of
those procedures that is distinct from his reaction to the outcomes
themselves. 132 Their studies demonstrated that people’s assessments of the
fairness of third-party decision making procedures shape their satisfaction
with their outcomes.133 Subsequent studies of procedural justice support
Thibaut and Walker’s pioneering work, finding that participants’ level of
satisfaction with decision making processes is “influenced by their
judgments about the fairness” of such processes. 134 Tom Tyler, one of the
leading commentators in this area, summarizes the literature in a 2000
article, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure:135
Studies of the legitimacy of authority suggest that people decide how legitimate
authorities are, and how much to defer to those authorities and to their
127
128
129
130
131

See TYLER, supra note 121, at 76.
Tyler, supra note 123, at 117.
TYLER, supra note 121, at 75.
Id. at 76.
See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978)

(proposing a general theory of procedure for resolving conflicts, based on social psychology
research examining characteristics of various systems in the legal process).
132 Id. at 548.
133 Id. at 549.
134 Tyler, supra note 123, at 103. Tyler went on to state:
Past studies have consistently found that judgments of the fairness of the procedures
that occur when citizens deal with legal authorities influence citizen satisfaction and
evaluation of those authorities. . . .
....
The findings . . . strongly support the suggestion of prior research that a key determinant
of citizen reactions to encounters with legal authorities is the respondents’ assessment
of the fairness of the procedures used in that contact.

Id. at 117, 128.
135 See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL.
117 (2000).
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decisions, primarily by assessing the fairness of their decision-making
procedures. Hence, using fair decision-making procedures is the key to
developing, maintaining, and enhancing the legitimacy of rules and authorities
and gaining voluntary deference to social rules.136

Tyler suggests that procedural justice may be even more important than
distributive justice in some contexts in shaping participants’ perspectives
concerning the fairness of decision making processes, including in contexts
in which the “right” decision is unclear:
In many social situations, it is not at all clear what decision or action is correct
in an objective sense. . . .

....
Thibaut & Walker (1978) argue that what is critical to good decision-making in
outcome-ambiguous situations is adherence to norms of fairness, and fairness
is most evident when procedures that are accepted as just are used to generate
the decision.137

Tyler concludes that “there are important reasons for optimism concerning
the viability of justice-based strategies for conflict resolution.”138 That is,
decision making strategies that are “procedurally just” would seem to have
significant potential to ameliorate citizens’ distrust of government,
independent of the outcomes of such processes.139
In short, given government’s interest in increasing its legitimacy with its
citizens, it seems that government routinely would want to consider the
“procedural justice” of its decision making processes in order to enhance
legitimacy to the extent that doing so is consistent with other objectives.
Given the social science findings described above, the CEC process seems to
represent a particularly good opportunity for the government to gain
legitimacy. The area of focus of the process is environmental enforcement,
an arena in which the right decision is often not clear from an objective
sense.140 Further, other opportunities for meaningful citizen engagement
with government officials are limited.141 Thus, if government wants to gain
legitimacy for its actions in this arena, it would seem to be particularly
helpful to it to have decision making processes that are fair and perceived as
such. The CEC process, a highly innovative mechanism that incorporates a

136
137
138

Id. at 120.
TYLER, supra note 121, at 100.
Tyler supra note 135, at 124.

139 One interesting question that this finding raises involves the extent to which
“procedurally just” processes may operate as a placebo to dampen citizens’ concerns about
government decisions that citizens should be concerned about. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory
Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States
Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (questioning the value of
procedures that create a sense of fairness in cases in which those procedures do not materially
advance actual justice).
140 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32, 837 (1985) (holding that government decisions
not to enforce generally are not subject to judicial review in part because of the numerous
factors involved in such decisions).
141 Markell, supra note 51, at 44.
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significant opportunity for public involvement, is one possible model for a
mechanism that, if effective, will enhance legitimacy of and confidence in
government enforcement practices.142
Given that government would be well-served by considering the issue of
“procedural justice” in formulating decision making processes, the next
question involves whether there are guideposts for evaluating the extent to
which decision making processes are likely to be “procedurally just.” To
paraphrase Professor Tyler, assuming an answer in the affirmative to the
first issue raised—whether procedural justice matters—the analysis then
turns to the second—the criteria that may be helpful in evaluating the
fairness of procedures.
Commentators have tended to focus on three key issues in formulating
frameworks for assessing the procedural justice of different decision making
processes: 1) the criteria to be used to evaluate fairness, 2) the weight to be
given each criterion, and 3) how the criteria are related.143 Further,
commentators have suggested that the answers to these questions are
contextual rather than universal; that is, peoples’ perceptions of procedural
justice “are found to vary depending on the nature of the situation.”144
Different scholars have posited different criteria for evaluating the
procedural justice of decision making processes.145 Professor Tyler suggests

142 On the other hand, even if prospective submitters believe that the process is
“procedurally just,” they might not have much interest in using it if the end result is not likely to
be of value to them. Thus, as noted supra note 138 (accompanying quote), in considering the
procedural justice implications of a mechanism such as the CEC citizen submission process, it
is also important to keep in mind the possible salience to citizens of the issue of effectiveness
(outcomes). Suggesting the likely importance of distributive justice to citizen satisfaction,
Professor Knox concludes that “the utility of a reporting procedure [i.e., the CEC process]
depends on the value of the reports it produces.” Knox, supra note 105, at 381. It certainly bears
further research to gauge the extent to which citizens consider the extent to which a process is
“procedurally just,” as well as the extent to which citizen interest in a process is determined by
their views concerning the likelihood that the process will give them what they want. As noted
supra note 7–18, other factors are likely to be relevant to citizens as well, including the
availability of alternative venues in which to raise their concerns. A great many factors, in short,
may influence the level of citizen participation, and the extent to which a process is perceived
to be “procedurally just” may be only one of them. Another issue, not addressed in detail in this
Article, involves the extent to which the involvement of organized interests should be viewed as
a surrogate or proxy in assessing adequacy of participation. See, e.g., Cuéllar, supra note 23, at
429–35 (examining public involvement in the regulatory process).
143 Tyler, supra note 123, at 106.
144 TYLER, supra note 121, at 92. People’s ratings of the importance of differing criteria vary
depending on the nature of the situation. These findings suggest there is no universally fair or
unfair procedure. Id. See also Tyler, supra note 123, at 123–24, 127 (suggesting that under
differing circumstances citizens judge procedural fairness by different criteria and that
therefore there are no universally fair procedures for allocation and dispute resolution; different
procedures are appropriate in different circumstances); Leventhal, supra note 123, at 39–40
(suggesting that the basic criteria used to evaluate the fairness of procedures change with
circumstances).
145 TYLER, supra note 121, at 87 (describing the different criteria of commentators and
recognizing that the framework for procedural justice is evolving); Leventhal, supra note 123, at
39 (suggesting that “[t]he criteria that define the rules of fair procedure can only be guessed at
this time, because there have been few studies of procedural fairness”).
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that the following four criteria are likely to be particularly important to
individuals’ determinations about whether governmental procedures are fair
or just: 1) the nature of opportunities to participate,146 2) whether the
authorities are neutral,147 3) the degree to which people trust the motives of
the authorities,148 4) and whether people are treated with dignity and respect
during the process.149
Part III of this Article demonstrates that prospective users of the citizen
submissions process have reduced their use of the process in recent years to
challenge the effectiveness of U.S. environmental enforcement efforts. This
Part provides a theoretical framework for considering possible rationales for
this decline, notably the possibility that prospective users may be skeptical
about the procedural justice of the process.150 In the next Part, I review the
146 Tyler, supra note 135, at 121–22 (noting that, where people may participate in the
resolution of their disputes or may voice their opinions to decision-makers, they view such a
procedure as more fair, even when their comments carry little weight in the outcome of the
conflict).
147 See id. at 122 (explaining people’s attribution of fairness to procedures in which the
authorities follow impartial rules and make decisions based on objective factors, not personal
feelings. “Basically, people seek a ‘level playing field’ in which no one is unfairly
disadvantaged.”).
148 See id. (describing the importance of trust—based on the authority’s thoughtful
consideration of the arguments presented and efforts to preserve fairness—in shaping people’s
views of procedural fairness).
149 See id. (pointing to the impact of the general desire to be treated with dignity and respect
on perceptions of fairness). For other formulations, compare Leventhal, supra note 123, at 39
(listing six criteria for procedural justice: 1) consistency, 2) the ability to suppress bias, 3)
decision quality or accuracy, 4) correctability, 5) representation, and 6) ethicality), and Thibaut
& Walker, supra note 130, at 563–64 (highlighting process control and decision control as two
primary criteria for evaluating procedural justice). Commentators have noted that some of
these considerations may trade-off. For an example, see TYLER, supra note 121, at 93–94 (noting
the trade-off between fairness and non-fairness criteria, such as between providing
representation—a voice for participants—and efficiency). Professor Tyler provides an example
in the sentencing context:

Literature on the psychology of judicial sentencing argues that magistrates can make
high-quality decisions that particularize punishment to the situation of each individual
defendant only if they have wide latitude to sentence inconsistently. This argument
suggests that consistency in sentencing is in conflict with decision quality,
operationalized in this case by sentences that will effectively rehabilitate criminals.
Tyler, supra note 123, at 106–07.
150 Outcome-related (“distributive justice”) issues may be a factor as well. See, e.g., supra
notes 116, 143 and accompanying text. Of course, it is possible that the explanation for the track
record described in Part II lies in whole or in part in developments external to the process itself.
It may be, for example, that use has declined because concerns about environmental
enforcement are less salient than they used to be, that priorities have shifted because of Sept.
11 or other developments, that resources have diminished, or that alternative domestic
processes to address NGO concerns have improved. Randy Christensen has commented on the
availability of domestic mechanisms as a possible reason why a decline in submissions targeting
the United States has not been accompanied by a similar decline in Canadian or Mexican
submissions:
A common explanation given for the low usage of the citizen submission process in the
U.S. is the wide availability of domestic enforcement mechanisms to pressure the
government to comply with environmental laws. These mechanisms include avenues
such as “citizen suit” provisions under federal environmental law statutes that result in
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workings of the process in the context of this procedural justice framework.
V. ASSESSMENTS OF THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS IN LIGHT OF ITS
TRACK RECORD AND THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE LITERATURE
This Part considers insights from the procedural justice literature that
may be helpful in assessing the CEC citizen submissions process. A central
insight from this literature is that the views of prospective submitters and
other interested parties of the citizen submissions process, including the
value in using it, may be based on procedural justice as well as distributive
justice considerations.151 As noted in Part IV, there is no consensus
framework at this point for assessing the extent to which any decision
making process is likely to be procedurally just.152 In addition, there is a
recognition that what is procedurally just will vary with the
circumstances.153 This Article analyzes the citizen submissions process with
these caveats and qualifications in mind.
Applying Tyler’s four criteria for assessing the legitimacy of decision
making processes to the submissions process (opportunities to participate,
neutrality, trust, and treatment with dignity and respect),154 the short answer
is that the literature suggests apparent shortcomings in the operation of the
process from a procedural justice standpoint. Part of the “blame” may lie
with the structure of the process, while the actions of the governments of
the three participating countries also appear to be responsible for some of
the dissatisfaction. As the 2004 TRAC Report puts it with respect to the
latter, “while they [the parties] publicly embrace the values that underlie the
process—transparency, accountability, stronger environmental protection—
they have in practice sought to circumscribe it, for reasons not well
appreciated by outside observers.”155 In other words, while particular
features of the process may be partially responsible for citizen frustration,
according to several commentators, the parties’ actions have undermined
citizen satisfaction with the process in terms of several elements of
procedural justice that Professor Tyler has identified.156
clear and enforceable results. In Canada and Mexico, there are significantly fewer
domestic avenues available for achieving similar results.
Christensen, supra note 59, at 171. Further, domestic expectations may be different as well,
including different expectations created by the relatively adversarial nature of the U.S. legal
system, and these differences may partially account for differences in use and in reactions to
the implementation experience. See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(describing the interaction between EPA goals and state implementation). Another possible
explanation for the decline is that “shifts in the broader political context [may have] affected
the value” of the CEC mechanism, as Professor Graubart suggests has been the case for the
NAALC. Graubart, supra note 95, at 101.
151 See supra Part III; see also supra note 150.
152 See supra Part III.
153 See supra Part III.
154 See supra Part III.
155 TRAC, supra note 29, at 42–43.
156 This Article focuses on the first three elements. There are, of course, issues associated
with the procedural justice of the process that do not stem from the parties’ implementation of
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A. Opportunities for Meaningful Participation
The CEC citizen submissions process provides three main opportunities
for active citizen participation. First, it is citizens who launch the process by
filing submissions.157 Neither the CEC Secretariat nor the CEC Council may
initiate an investigation under the CEC citizen submissions process sua
sponte; the capacity of either to act under the process is predicated on a
citizen filing a submission that identifies alleged enforcement failures.158
Thus, the process empowers citizens to decide where to shine the CEC
spotlight. Common sense suggests that this opportunity to frame the issues
is an important element under the rubric of opportunities to participate.
Next, if the CEC Secretariat decides that a submission is inadequate
and dismisses it, a citizen may refile the submission within thirty days after
receiving the dismissal.159 Further, there is nothing to stop a citizen from
filing a new submission if the Secretariat or Council decides not to develop a
factual record based on a citizen’s initial submission. Thus, citizens are not
subject to res judicata-type constraints on filing submissions.160
Finally, if the CEC decides to develop a factual record, the factual
record process gives interested citizens a chance to submit information to
the CEC Secretariat. Article 15(4) of the Agreement authorizes the
Secretariat to consider “any relevant technical, scientific or other
information” that is “submitted by interested non-governmental
organizations or persons.”161 Thus, following their initiation of the process,
citizens may contribute additional information for consideration as part of
the development of a factual record, if a submission makes it to that point.
There are also significant limits affecting citizens’ opportunities to
participate in the CEC process, some of which have been the focus of citizen
critiques. I discuss here three limitations that various commentators have
identified. First, if the CEC Secretariat determines that a submission raises
matters that deserve further consideration, the Secretariat can request
additional information from the relevant party and then determine whether
to dismiss the submission or to recommend to the Council that a factual
record be developed.162 Some commentators have urged that submitters
should have an opportunity to respond to a party’s response before the
Secretariat makes its final decision as to whether to recommend

the Agreement. This Part identifies some of these concerns as well. The commentary suggests,
however, that the parties’ stances on a variety of issues are among the more significant features
of implementation that have caused citizen dissatisfaction.
157 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(1).
158 Id.
159 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION OF N. AM., BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT A GUIDE TO
ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 14
(2000), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/BringingFacts-Jun02_en.pdf [hereinafter
BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT]. Any dismissal of a submission is supposed to include an
explanation of the reasons for the dismissal. Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 6.1.
160 For an overview of res judicata, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 17 (1982).
161 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(4).
162 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 4.
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development of a factual record.163 In Lessons Learned, JPAC recommended
that it would “improve public confidence in the decision making process” to
allow submitters to submit a response, particularly where “a Party’s
response includes new information not referred to in the original
Submission.”164
To address a second limitation on citizen participation in the process,
after the Secretariat has submitted a recommendation to the Council to
develop a factual record, JPAC and others have recommended that
submitters should have an opportunity, if a party “chooses to submit
additional information directly to the Council in response to such a
recommendation from the Secretariat . . . to make a brief written reply to
such information so that the Council can make a more fully informed
decision on the Secretariat’s recommendation.”165 To date the Council has
rejected these suggestions, stating that they would “lead to exchanges . . .
that will result in a more adversarial public submissions process which we
do not believe would benefit the process.”166
A third limitation that citizens have identified in their opportunities to
participate involves the Secretariat’s draft factual records. When the Council
directs the Secretariat to prepare a factual record, the Secretariat develops a
draft factual record, which it provides to the Council but is not authorized to
share with the submitters for their review or comment.167 Thus, while the
Secretariat obtains and considers the parties’ comments on draft factual
records before it develops a final factual record, NGOs are not allowed to
see the draft, let alone comment on it. As might be expected, the NGO
community has balked at this uneven playing field in terms of its
opportunities to participate.168
Because of these limitations on citizen participation, Professor Yang
has argued that “[o]nce a submission has been filed, the process is entirely
controlled and managed by the Secretariat and Council.”169 While, as noted
163
164
165

Id. at 12.
Id. at 16.
Id.

166 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION OF N. AM., THE JPAC AT TEN: A REVIEW OF THE JOINT
PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 15 (2005) (quoting Letter from Council (Mar. 6, 2002)).
167 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(5).
168 Two offsetting features of this process are: 1) the parties’ comments have ultimately
become a matter of public record since the Secretariat has included such comments as
appendices in its final factual records, which are available to the public; and 2) the parties’
comments are supposed to be limited to raising issues concerning the accuracy of the draft
factual record, although that has not always been the case. See, e.g., BC Aboriginal Fisheries
Commission et al. (SEM-97-001) (May 30, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/BC-Hydr-Factrecord_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006).
169 Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen
Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales Y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 478 (2005).
Cf. Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements on Social
Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Side Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 425, 433 (2001) (suggesting that “each phase offers political opportunities for
submitters to advance their underlying cause in terms of receiving official legitimacy for their
concern, forcing a response form the government or advancing their issues on the governmental
agenda”).
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above, citizens do have the right to submit information as part of the factual
record process, Professor Yang’s perspective likely captures the larger point,
notably that limits in opportunities to participate may be a factor in citizen
satisfaction.
Two other more systemic limitations to participation deserve attention
as well. First, the entire CEC process generally takes place through
submission and exchanges of written documents. While the process is
underway, there is little, if any, opportunity for citizens to engage the CEC
decision-makers (the Secretariat or the Council); similarly, there is little, if
any, formal opportunity for citizens to engage the party whose practices are
at issue. Jody Freeman, among others, has argued that such interactions
beyond the exchange of written materials have value. She suggests that
“collaborative governance” (i.e., multi-stakeholder processes) are likely “to
be sites at which regulatory problems are redefined, innovative solutions
[are] devised, and institutional relationships [are] rethought.”170 While
further research would be useful to determine the weight citizens attach to
the lack of opportunity for such interactions, some citizens have complained
that this limitation reduces the value of citizen participation, and also
significantly reduces the utility of what they consider to be a “cooperative”
rather than an adversarial process.171 On the other hand, another
commentator has suggested that, despite this general limitation to formal,
written exchanges, the process does enable or facilitate a dialogue, either in
the context of the process itself, or at a domestic level, noting that the
process:
[I]s most effectively utilized where submitters are engaged in ongoing advocacy
and wish to draw government into “discussion” on issues as framed by the
submitters, or where the submitters are seeking a mechanism that will provide
access to decision-makers or media. The citizen submission process also can
assist in the building of international coalitions by providing a clear and visible

170 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
7 (1997). Freeman invokes the “republican principle [that] unanticipated or novel solutions are
likely to emerge from face-to-face deliberative engagement among knowledgeable parties who
would never otherwise share information or devise solutions together.” Id. at 22–23.
171 See JOINT PUB. ADVISORY COMM., WORKSHOP ON THE HISTORY OF CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION 3 (2000), available at http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/pdfs/sr-wrkshp-e.pdf
[hereinafter JPAC WORKSHOP] (noting the views of Cliff Wallis that submitters should be
allowed to present their case orally). The Commission further notes the views of Hervé Pageot
that:

The Party and the submitter should meet in the event that Council does not decide to
proceed with the development of a factual record. The idea is that the system should
encourage consensus, not provoke confrontation. In this way, submitter could ascertain
the reasons adduced by Council as well as the positions of the other Parties.

Id. at 3. JPAC notes that the BC Hydro Factual Record process, which included an opportunity
for the key stakeholders to interact with the experts the Secretariat retained to assist with the
Factual Record, “incorporated procedures to improve public participation that were not present
in the Cozumel Pier Factual Record.” LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 5.
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effort that other organizations can support.172

Second, there is no support for citizens to participate in the process.
Domestic environmental laws often provide attorneys’ fees to citizens, at
least under certain circumstances.173 Some laws also provide NGOs with
funding to enable them to hire technical support, in order to facilitate
meaningful citizen participation.174 The CEC provides neither. Features of
the CEC process may reduce the need for citizen support. The CEC
Secretariat is supposed to serve as the neutral investigator of concerns that
citizens raise (citizens act primarily as pullers of the CEC “fire alarm,”
calling the Secretariat and parties to action); this arguably limits the need for
extensive citizen submissions.175 Further, the CEC process is less processintensive than civil litigation in the United States since there is no discovery
or other pre-trial work of the sort that characterizes such practice.176 Thus,
at least in theory, the investment of citizens need not be as great to bring a
case before the CEC as would be the case domestically.177 Another question
that deserves follow-up involves the weight that citizens attach to such
funding mechanisms and the importance of not including such a mechanism
in the CEC process.
A final issue relating to participation involves the extent to which the
process helps inform citizens independent of their active participation in it.
The CEC itself and outside commentators frequently have highlighted the
importance of transparency. In its Framework for Public Participation in
CEC Activities, for example, the CEC states that “the CEC endeavor[s] to
conduct its activities in an open and transparent fashion.”178 In keeping with

172

Christensen, supra note 59, at 183.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL., 989 n.8; ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 2003).
174 See, e.g., Markell, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing measures states have taken to
encourage citizen participation, citing specifically efforts in New York).
175 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (comparing congressional “policepatrol” oversight with citizen “fire-alarm” oversight).
176 Raymond MacCallum, Evaluating the Citizen Submission Procedure Under the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 395, 421
(1997) (noting that “the procedure potentially provides a means of private participation in the
promotion of enforcement, which avoids the expense of domestic legal proceedings”). Related
to this, Secretariat information-gathering efforts may obviate or diminish the need for citizen
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which can be time consuming and expensive to
pursue.
177 Some commentators suggest that Council decisions have made the process more difficult,
time consuming, and expensive for submitters. See infra note 224. ELI suggests, for example,
that the Council’s decision concerning the Ontario Logging submission “appears to add to the
existing ‘pleading’ requirements of the NAAEC a new and higher evidentiary threshold for the
sufficiency of information necessary to support allegations of non-enforcement.” ISSUES
RELATED, supra note 29, at iv. ELI notes that doing so “potentially increases the financial and
human resources burdens placed on [submitters].” Id. It cites some of the individuals it
interviewed as arguing that “in setting the bar for ‘sufficient information’ too high, the Council
may render it prohibitively difficult for citizens to participate in the process.” Id.
178 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN COMMISSION
173
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this objective, the Framework indicates that the public “should be provided
with all relevant CEC documents . . . for their [the public’s] involvement in
CEC activities.”179
The process has the potential to inform citizens about government
enforcement policies and practices and the government’s thinking in
developing and implementing such policies and practices, because of the
transparency of the process, the obligations it imposes on the governments
to explain their actions (and inaction), and the opportunities it gives the
Secretariat to explain its views and develop additional information.180 For
example, citizens have access to countries’ responses to submissions, to the
Secretariat’s reasoning concerning the submission in the form of the various
documents the Secretariat issues in connection with each submission, to
documents that others submit during the pendency of the factual record
process, and to factual records themselves.181 Some commentators have
suggested that the information flow the process generates, and the
transparency of the process, are helpful to citizens, and ultimately to the
formulation and implementation of environmental policy:
The citizen submission process and the information systems operated by the
CEC create political pressure by allowing public scrutiny of a NAFTA party’s
record of effectively enforcing its domestic environmental laws. With improved
information about and a clearer understanding of North American
environmental issues, implementation of and compliance with NAAEC will be
more effective. The NAAEC, in light of its objectives, clearly wanted more
information to be made open to the public. The availability of information
concerning environmental issues affects national behavior, and thus supports
the effectiveness of the NAAEC.182

Greg Block wrote in a 2003 article that:
A number of Mexican nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and policy
analysts attest to the positive impact the CEC has made on transparency in
governmental decision making and access to information, as well as certain
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES 5 (1999) available at http://www.cec.org/
files/pdf/publications/guide19_en.pdf.
179
180

Id.
See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.

181 For a few years the Council delayed public release of Secretariat recommendations to
prepare factual records, but it abandoned this approach in the face of considerable criticism.
Council Res. 01-06, 1–2, C.E.C. Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev. 4 (June 29, 2001),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-06r4_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). Mexico, in
particular, has received criticism for asserting confidentiality concerning some of the materials
it has submitted and thereby reducing the transparency of the process. JOINT PUB. ADVISORY
COMM., PUBLIC COMMENTS RELATED TO THE CITIZENS SUBMISSION PROCESS UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND
15 OF THE NAAEC: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE/LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2001), available at
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/comments/EHC2.pdf.
182 Mark R. Goldschmidt, The Role of Transparency and Public Participation in International
Environmental Agreements: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV 343, 392 (2002).
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aspects of domestic environmental policy. The CEC’s access to information
policies, decision making records, citizen submission process, and public
Council sessions have helped shape Mexican citizens’ expectations for the
conduct of government business for national agencies and public institutions.
That the Mexican Environmental Ministry is regarded as one of the more open
and transparent Mexican government agencies is in a small, but not
inconsequential way, due to its intense interaction with the CEC and civil
society.183

Professor Vega-Cánovas states that “the NAAEC appears to have
enhanced the capacity of domestic interest groups to engage national
government decision-makers in international relations” and indirectly
influence government policy.184
Thus, the procedural justice literature suggests that citizens’
opportunities to participate in decision making processes affect their degree
of satisfaction with such processes. The CEC citizen submissions process
affords citizens significant opportunities to participate, but citizens also
have complained about some of the limitations in these opportunities. This
discussion is intended to identify some of the positive aspects of
opportunities to participate in the CEC process as well as citizen concerns.
Further systematic inquiry will help to enhance understanding of citizens’
perspectives, and of whether there are ways to revamp the CEC process to
engender greater citizen satisfaction with opportunities to participate.

B. Neutrality and Trust
There seems to be a significant overlap in these criteria, at least in
183 Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 516
(2003); see also Yang, supra note 169, at 443. Professor Yang notes that there are several points

in the citizen submissions process that have the potential to produce information that otherwise
might not see the light of day and, once made public, lead to improvements in domestic
environmental enforcement practices. First, the existence of the process may trigger work by
submitters to compile and present information in their submissions about domestic
enforcement practices that would not be gathered and developed if the forum did not exist.
Second, in its screening determinations early in the process the Secretariat provides an
independent perspective on issues such as the types and extent of environmental harms
potentially resulting from the enforcement practices at issue. Third, the country’s response
often contains information about its enforcement practices that otherwise would not be
gathered, developed or shared. Fourth, the Secretariat’s recommendations that a factual record
be prepared provide another opportunity for this neutral body to review the assertions in the
submission and the response of the country, and consider whether developing information
would be likely to enhance domestic environmental enforcement, as well as serve other public
policy goals (a Secretariat decision to dismiss a submission at this juncture also may add value
by providing a neutral perspective about the weight or merit of the submitter’s concerns). The
countries’ collective response to the Secretariat’s recommendations is another point for
consideration of the enforcement practices at issue in a submission. Finally, the creation of a
factual record provides extensive opportunity for obtaining, developing, and presenting
substantial information about whether a country has failed to effectively enforce its
environmental laws in a particular context. Id.
184 Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, NAFTA and the Environment, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55, 61
(2001).
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terms of the CEC process, making joint treatment appropriate. The CEC’s
most recent commissioned report, the 2004 TRAC report, concludes that, in
spite of various successes, one of the “important concerns” that has emerged
is that the citizens’ submission process (“the NAAEC’s most innovative
public participation mechanism”) “has become mired in controversy.”185 The
TRAC report suggests that the Council’s performance in particular has
raised concerns about the neutrality of the citizen submissions process and
triggered a decline in trust. The TRAC Report, for example, quotes a
submission from a team of legal advisors from the three countries who
advise the Secretariat on the citizen submissions process that Councilimposed restrictions on the scope of the process “ha[ve] the potential to
permanently undermine the integrity of the process to the point where it is
of limited interest to potential submitters.”186 The legal advisors highlighted
the importance of public confidence in the process and the dangers posed by
a loss of such confidence: “Process integrity and credibility are critical
because it is a public process that relies on and is driven by the responses
and actions of citizens and NGOs in the three countries.”187
Other than citizen submitters, the CEC Secretariat and the CEC Council
are the primary participants in the CEC citizen submissions process. Thus,
this section examines the role that each of these entities has played for
insights concerning the extent to which each is perceived to be neutral and
has gained the trust of NGOs; and for insights concerning the implications of
their performance for NGOs’ overall sense as to whether the process is
neutral and deserves trust.
To begin with the Secretariat, it is by no means inevitable that citizens
would think highly of the Secretariat based on the institutional design of the
CEC. The Council members appoint the CEC Executive Director.188 Thus, to
the extent that citizens are leery of the parties as neutral actors because of
their inherent conflict of interest in implementing the citizen submissions
process (on the one hand, the parties are supposed to work together as the
Council to support the Agreement, while on the other the parties are the
subject or target of submissions),189 citizens might well be concerned that
the Secretariat’s neutrality or independence is compromised by the
Executive Director’s accountability to the parties.190 Further, the Executive
Director traditionally has had a three year term, renewable one time at the
discretion of the Council.191 NGOs might perceive that this arrangement

185
186

TRAC, supra note 29, at 5.
Id. at 45 (citing Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Dir., Submissions on Enforcement

Matters Unit, to Jon Plaut, Chair, JPAC (Feb. 15, 2002) (on file with author)).
187 Id. I explore these issues in more detail in Governance of International Institutions, supra
note 27.
188 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Rules of Employment, Rule 13, http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/PUBLICATIONS/EMP-dec-2002_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006); NAAEC, supra note
28, art. 11.
189 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27.
190 Article 11(4) of the NAAEC is intended to ameliorate this concern, as well as related
concerns about undue Party influence on CEC staff. See NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 11(4)
(explaining NAAEC functions).
191 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 11(1).
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creates the potential that an Executive Director might try to curry favor with
the Council in order to maximize the chances for renewal.
The Council also has the possibility of influencing the selection and
renewal of CEC staff, including members of the CEC Submissions Unit. The
Council-appointed Executive Director appoints the CEC staff.192 In addition,
the Council has a veto over such appointments.193 Further, CEC staff
generally operate on two or three year renewable contracts, which creates
similar potential leverage for the Council through its control of the identity
of the Executive Director.194
Another aspect of the CEC structure and operation that seemingly
creates a potential for Secretariat bias in favor of the Council and against the
interest of citizens whose submissions press the parties is that the
Secretariat works closely with the Council on the “cooperative work
program” of the CEC. Indeed, the vast majority of Secretariat professional
staff focuses its attention on the cooperative program and the majority of
the CEC’s budget is allocated to these activities.195 There is a chance that the
Secretariat might favor the parties in the citizen submissions process in
order to improve prospects for success for the cooperative program, and/or
that citizens might perceive that this arrangement creates built-in Secretariat
bias in favor of the parties.
Finally, the Council and its surrogates (high level agency officials) meet
regularly throughout the year with the Secretariat on various matters,
including citizen submissions process issues. There is no corresponding final
opportunity for citizens to engage the Secretariat in this way. JPAC’s
presence at these meetings seemingly has the potential to offset this
potential for imbalance (perceived and/or real) to some degree, but not
entirely.196
In short, because of the institutional design of the CEC, there are
numerous reasons why citizens might be inclined to be wary of the
Secretariat and skeptical of its neutrality. I now turn to the Secretariat’s
track record in implementing the process for possible insights as to whether
the Secretariat’s implementation of its responsibilities may have
192
193

Id. art. 11(2).
Id. art. 11(3).

194 I am not aware of any evidence that the structural features concerning the Executive
Director or SEM Unit staff discussed in the text have raised concerns to date. The NAAEC
makes clear the “international character” of the Secretariat staff and directs the parties to
respect this character. Id. art. 11(4). Further, article 11(2)(a) specifies that staff be “appointed
and retained . . . strictly on the basis of efficiency, competence and integrity.” Id. art. 11(2)(a).
195 See Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Advice to Council No. 02-11 (Oct. 21, 2002),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/02-11eRev1.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006).
196 The JPAC is allowed to provide advice to the Council on any matter that is within the
scope of the NAAEC. NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 16. In recent years, the JPAC has been a
regular participant in Secretariat/Party meetings to facilitate the JPAC’s playing this role. See
Wirth, supra note 40, at 199, 204–05 (describing JPAC’s relationship with the Secretariat). The
concerns I raise in the text are, to the best of my knowledge, hypothetical in nature. I am not
aware of any evidence that these institutional features have created a sense of skepticism
concerning Secretariat neutrality, or that they have undermined such neutrality. See, supra note
194.
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exacerbated, or allayed, possible citizen concerns about Secretariat
neutrality.
The CEC Secretariat conducts an initial review of each submission
based on a set of factors contained in the NAAEC (article 14(1) and 14(2))
and determines whether to consider the submission further or dismiss it.197
If the Secretariat determines that the submission warrants further review,
the Secretariat requests that the relevant party prepare and submit a written
response to the submission.198 Otherwise, the Secretariat dismisses the
submission, thereby completing consideration of the submission under the
citizen submissions process.199
The Secretariat’s track record in performing this early filtering function
suggests that it has been fairly rigorous in its review. It certainly has not
served as a “rubber stamp” for citizen complaints. As of December 31, 2005,
sixteen submissions have been dismissed at the article 14(1) or (2) stage,
and the Secretariat has requested a response for 36 submissions (see Table
4).
40

36

35
30
Dismissed
Requests for
Information

25
20

16

15
10
5
0

Table 4: Secretariat’s Decisions under article 14(1) and (2) (Through

December 31, 2005)200

197
198

NAAEC, supra note 28, arts. 14(1), 14(2).
Id. art. 14(2).

199 The submitter may re-submit within 30 days and the Secretariat will review this revised
submission. BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT, supra note 159, at 12.
200 Table 4 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, supra note 92. The actual handling of submissions complicates the picture at the
margins since, in some cases, the Secretariat has issued two or more rulings at the 14(1) or
14(2) stage. In some cases, for example, the Secretariat initially dismissed a submission, the
submitter re-filed, and the Secretariat then requested a response from the party. See, e.g.,
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, El Boludo
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Thus, in exercising its filtering responsibility at this early stage of the
citizen submissions process the Secretariat has dismissed more than 30% of
the 52 submissions filed to date.201
The Secretariat’s second decision, following the parties’ response,202 is
to either recommend development of a factual record, or dismiss the
submission. 203 A factual record, again, is the ultimate product of the citizen
submissions process and is considered to be the most visible part of the CEC
spotlight and the most comprehensive review of information relevant to the
alleged enforcement failures.204 If the Secretariat determines that further
review is appropriate through development of a factual record, the
Secretariat provides a Recommendation to that effect to the Council (again,
comprised of the leading environmental officials of the parties).205 The
Recommendation contains the Secretariat’s analysis of the submission and
response, and explains why the Secretariat thinks that further review of the
allegations in the submission is warranted. Alternatively, the Secretariat is
empowered to unilaterally dismiss a submission at this point in the
process—thus, terminating consideration of the submission.206
Here again, the Secretariat’s performance might be a source of concern

Project, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=80 (last
visited July 16, 2006). Thus, the number of Secretariat dismissals at this stage is greater than
depicted in Table 4. Further, Table 4 also arguably over counts the number of submissions since
some submissions were later re-filed outside the 30-day window. See, e.g., Comm’n for Envtl.
Cooperation,
Citizen
Submissions
on
Enforcement
Matters,
Molymex
I,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=54 (last visited
July 15, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters,
ALCA-Iztapalapa,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&
ID=81 (last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo, http://www.cec.org/
citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=100 (last visited July 16, 2006).
201 Secretariat rejection of a submission at the 14(1) stage should not necessarily be viewed
as ‘anti-submitter.’ Such a rejection, followed by 30 days for re-filing, provides submitters with
an opportunity to strengthen the submission so that it has a greater likelihood of producing a
factual record. Further, submitters may re-file submissions that the Secretariat dismisses at the
article 14(1) stage and in some cases such re-filed submissions have reached the factual record
stage. See, e.g., Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters,
Molymex II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=56
(last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/
index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=93 (last visited May 28, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation,
Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=108 (last visited
July 16, 2006).
202 parties are not obligated to file a response if the Secretariat requests one, but thus far the
parties uniformly have done so. BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT, supra note 159, at 14. In either
event, following its request for a response and any Party response, the Secretariat reaches a
second decision stage.
203 See NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(1).
204 Several phases of the citizen submissions process have the potential to serve as a
spotlight, but the creation of a factual record is the most significant part of this spotlighting
process. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 169, at 456–57.
205 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15.
206

Id.
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for submitters. 207 As of December 31, 2005, the Secretariat has made twentyone recommendations to the Council that a factual record is warranted and
dismissed eleven submissions after receiving a party’s response (see Table 5).

25
Secretariat
Notifications to the
Council under Article
15(1) that a Factual
Record is Warranted

21
20

15
11

Secretariat
Dismissals under
Article 14(3) or 15(1)

10

5

0

Table 5: Secretariat Decisions to Recommend Factual Records or

Dismiss Submissions Following a party Response (
Through December 31, 2005) 208
Thus, the Secretariat has dismissed more than 1/3 of the submissions it has
considered at this stage of the process.209
In short, the Secretariat’s track record in performing these central
functions in the citizen submissions process certainly does not reflect that
the Secretariat has “rubber-stamped” submissions. Instead, the Secretariat
has served as a fairly vigilant filter. Consequently, citizens may be
disappointed with these Secretariat outcomes. This track record, in other
words, might confirm citizens’ fears that they are not likely to receive much
support from the Secretariat.
The anecdotal feedback concerning the Secretariat’s performance
207 On the other hand, some submitters might believe that Secretariat decisions at the 15(1)
stage have provided considerable information regarding the submitters’ assertions, in a way that
might satisfy “procedural justice” concerns.
208 Table 5 was developed using data released by the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Who We Are / Council, http://cec.org/who_we_
are/council/resolutions/index.cfm?varlan=English (last visited July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Who
We Are]. CEC Council Resolutions from 1994 through 2005 were reviewed to determine the
number per year in which the CEC Secretariat made the decision to either recommend the
preparation of a factual record under article 15(1) or to dismiss a submission following a party
response under article 14(3) or 15(1). The number of those resolutions were then totaled
separately as reflected above.
209 COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, supra note 92.
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reflects confidence in the Secretariat’s neutrality and trust in its
performance—despite possible concerns of the sort described above
regarding institutional design and actual performance. External reviews of
the citizen submissions process generally have given the Secretariat high
marks for its impartiality and for the quality of the determinations issued. A
1998 review of the CEC conducted by the Independent Review Committee
(IRC) surveyed the work of the citizens submission process and some of the
scholarly and other commentary about the process, and concluded that
“[t]he record on the submissions that have been subject to Secretariat
decisions to date appears to show a consistent and well reasoned group of
decisions.”210 Furthermore, the report stated:
While observers (and the Parties) may, and some certainly have,
specific decisions, this Committee has seen nothing to suggest
decisions of the Secretariat lack proper foundation. Indeed, the IRC
concurs with the view expressed by some commentators that the
making by the Secretariat has been professional and appropriate.211

criticized
that the
generally
decision-

Because of its favorable assessment, the IRC saw no reason to recommend
refinements to the process.212
More recent studies have generally been positive in their review of
Secretariat performance—characterizing citizen perception of this
performance as quite supportive. The TRAC 2004 report found that
“[s]ubmitters and outside observers by and large believe that the Secretariat
has performed its obligations well.”213 Chris Wold, the lawyer for the
submitters who filed the only submission to lead to a factual record
involving the United States, similarly has stated that “the Secretariat has
established itself as a highly professional institution that carefully interprets
the NAAEC in a way that promotes the NAAEC’s objectives.”214 Wold notes
that “[s]cholars, NAAEC review committees, and members of the public are
virtually unanimous in applauding the Secretariat’s rigorous review of
submission for eligibility and for determination on whether a factual record
210 FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 29, § 3.3.3; see also, Chris Wold et al., supra note 58, at 421
n.26 (discussing the Secretariat’s even-handed and objective approach toward eligibility and
development of the factual record).
211 FOUR-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 29, § 3.3.3. Compare Kal Raustiala, International

“Enforcement of Enforcement” Under the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 721, 730–43 (1996) (providing a favorable assessment of the
Secretariat’s decisions in the citizen submissions process), with Tutchton, supra note 118, at
48–69 (criticizing the Secretariat’s actions).
212 A study published around the same time found that citizens thought highly of the
Secretariat’s performance. DiMento & Doughman, supra note 32, at 695–96 (reporting results of
a survey the authors had undertaken concerning the process, and concluding that “[i]n general,
respondents concluded that the response of the Secretariat to each of the submissions was
appropriate”).
213 TRAC, supra note 29, at 45. The April 2001 JPAC Lessons Learned report reached much
the same conclusion. LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 9–15 (noting also, though, that
timeliness needs to be improved in operation of the process, including in the Secretariat’s
performance of its responsibilities, and concluding that the Secretariat required additional
resources to complete its work more expeditiously).
214 Wold et al., supra note 58, at 421 (2004).
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is warranted.”215
Thus, despite possible institutional design issues or concerns based on
results or outcomes, anecdotal information suggests considerable NGO
confidence or trust in the Secretariat’s performance of its responsibilities in
the citizen submissions process.216
The level of citizen trust in the Council and the individual parties, and
the level of citizen confidence in the Council’s neutrality, appear, at least
anecdotally, to be much lower.217 Part of this may be due to the
institutionally-created “conflict of interest” that the structure of the process
creates.218 At least superficially, on the other hand, there are parts of the
track record of the Council’s performance in responding to individual
submissions that seem quite supportive of the process, and therefore might
have been expected to earn the Council credibility for its efforts.
The parties’ first opportunity to participate in the CEC process comes
when the CEC Secretariat determines that a submission warrants a party
response.219 It is not clear how citizens view the parties’ performance at this
stage of the process. It might be reasonable to assume that citizens generally
would conclude that the parties’ participation at this stage reflects an effort
to support the process since the countries have provided a formal, written
response to each submission for which the Secretariat has requested one
even though they are not legally obligated to do so.220 Indeed, many of these
responses have been quite substantial.221

215 Id. See also Knox, supra note 105, at 383 (suggesting that “[t]he Secretariat’s impartiality
and thoroughness, which it demonstrates by its careful quasi-judicial opinions as well as it
rejection of submissions that do not meet the NAAEC criteria, lend its recommendations added
weight”).
216 The TRAC Report notes that: “[g]overnmental officials have criticized the Secretariat’s
lack of understanding of government decision-making processes and the political needs of
Council members. All three parties have felt that the Secretariat has at some time exceeded its
authority under NAAEC.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 32. The TRAC report does not offer much
insight regarding the significance of the level of Party criticism (e.g., whether a Party is
concerned with one possible instance of Secretariat “overreaching” or whether one or more
parties believes the problem is more endemic), or regarding the merits of such concerns.
217 See infra notes 221, 233–72 and accompanying text.
218 In its Advice 03-05, JPAC noted that there is an “emerging perception” that the Council
has a conflict of interest and noted that it may “reflect a structural challenge within the NAAEC
itself.” Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Advice to Council No: 03-05, 3,
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/JPAC/Advice03-05_EN.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006). Notably,
JPAC and others have argued that “[i] these decisions/actions will adversely affect the
credibility of the process; and [ii] they will contribute to an emerging perception of the Council
members operating with a conflict of interest.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 45; see also Governance
of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 780–87.
219 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 14(2).
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., U.S. Response, Great Lakes (SEM-98-003), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/98-003/RSP
(Mar. 12, 1999), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-3-rsp-e.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). Other
responses have contained little information of value. Further, Mexico has asserted
confidentiality concerning at least part of several of its formal, written responses, thereby
preventing the public from reviewing them, despite the NAAEC’s strong overall objective of
promoting transparency and frequent statements by the Council supporting this objective. See,
e.g., Council Res. 00-09, C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006) (favoring

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

696

[Vol. 36:651

On the other hand, skeptical citizens, particularly, might not find much
solace in the parties’ having provided responses, since in many of their
responses the parties have argued that further investigation or information
gathering (that is, development of a factual record) is not appropriate.222
Instead, in many responses the party involved has urged the Secretariat to
dismiss the submission.223 Thus, if the parties’ positions at this stage had
prevailed, the citizen submissions process would have produced few factual
records, despite its operation for more than ten years. My own intuitive
sense is that a substantively valuable response is likely to earn a party
credibility with many submitters, even if the party ultimately urges dismissal
of the submission, but this question deserves further investigation.
The first opportunity for the Council as a whole to participate in the
CEC citizen submission processes arises in response to a Secretariat
recommendation to the Council that a factual record be developed. When it
receives a Recommendation from the Secretariat, the Council decides, by
two-thirds vote, whether to direct the Secretariat to proceed with
development of a “factual record”224 or whether to reject such a
Recommendation and direct dismissal of the submission.225 As Table 6
reflects, as of December 31, 2005, the Council has authorized the Secretariat
to prepare factual records for sixteen submissions and it has directed the
Secretariat to dismiss two submissions.226

transparency); JPAC Advisory Committee Session No. 00-01, C.E.C. Doc. J/00-02/SR (March 23–
24, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/SR0001E_EN.PDF (last visited May 28, 2006);
Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Crushed Gravel
in
Puerto
Penasco,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=
english&ID=106 (last visited July 16, 2006); Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, Citizen
Submissions on Enforcement Matters, Lake Chapala II, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/
details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=90 (last visited July 16, 2006); see also LESSONS LEARNED,
supra note 29, at 11 (noting that “[s]everal commentators expressed concern regarding what
they perceived as an increase in parties’ reliance on the confidentiality provisions of articles 39
and 42”).
222 See, e.g., Canada Response, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP
(July 21, 1997), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-1-RSP-E.PDF (last visited Jul 16, 2006); U.S.
Response, Migratory Birds (SEM-99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/99-002/04/RSP (Feb. 29, 2000),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF1842.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006). This has not always
been the case.
223 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 11–12.
224 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(2).
225
226

Id.

The Council initially deferred consideration of the Oldman River submission before
voting to endorse a factual record for this submission. Compare Council Res. 00-02, 1, C.E.C.
Doc. C/C.01/00-04/RES/02 (May 16, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/0002e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (deferring consideration), with Council Res. 01-08, 2,
C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/03/Final (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/
COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (endorsing factual record). Similarly, the
Council initially deferred consideration of the Secretariat recommendation to prepare a factual
record for SEM-02-001 and later issued a Resolution directing preparation of a factual record for
this submission. See Council Res. 03-05, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Ontario-Logging_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006);
Council
Res.
04-03,
C.E.C.
Doc.
C/C.01/04-01/RES/03
(Mar.
12,
2004),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Ontario-Logging-Res-04-03_en.pdf (last visited July 16,
2006). In Council Resolution 05-04 (issued Apr. 1, 2005), the Council directed the Secretariat to
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16

2

No. of Council Resolutions
Authorizing Preparation of a
Factual Record

No. of Council Resolutions
Specifically Instructing
Secretariat Not to Prepare a
Factual Record

Table 6: Council Resolutions Authorizing Factual Records or

Dismissing Decisions227
Thus, in the vast majority of cases to come before it (88%), the Council
has appeared to be responsive to citizen concerns and Secretariat judgments
that such concerns warrant more in-depth review and attention from the
citizen submissions process. Interestingly, this is the case even though in
many of the submissions for which the Secretariat recommended that a
factual record be developed, the party whose enforcement practices were at
issue had initially urged dismissal of the submission. 228 One might
reasonably conclude that citizens would be satisfied with, and supportive of,
the Council’s record at this first decision point in the process.
The second Council decision point in the process involves the decision
whether to approve release of a final factual record. As noted above,
following the Secretariat’s development of a draft factual record, the
Secretariat seeks comments from the Council concerning the accuracy of
the draft, develops a final factual record, and submits this final record to the
Council.229 It then is up to the Council to decide, by two-thirds vote, whether
to release the factual record to the public. 230 The Council has voted
prepare a factual record for SEM-04-006, and directed that the Secretariat consolidate this
submission with the Ontario Logging submission (SEM-02-001) “for the purpose of developing
one consolidated factual record for both submissions.” Council Res. 05-04, C.E.C. Doc.
C/C.01/05/RES//04/Final (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-05-04_
en.pdf (last visited July 165, 2006).
227 Table 6 was developed using data released by the Secretariat. COMM’N FOR ENVTL.
COOPERATION, supra note 92.
228 See supra note 222.
229 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text (describing in more detail the Council’s
process for approving release of a final factual record).
230 NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 15(7).
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unanimously to release the factual records that the Secretariat has
submitted.231
All in all, the Council’s record seems supportive of the submissions
process and would seem likely to engender confidence that the Council is
maintaining a neutral stance in performing its role and has earned the trust
of interested parties. In particular, in the vast majority of cases (sixteen out
of eighteen) the Council has endorsed the Secretariat’s recommendation that
a factual record be developed.232 For each of the affirmative votes, the
Council endorsement has been unanimous.233 Even the party that has been
the subject of the submission has voted to pursue a factual record.234 The
fact that for several submissions the targeted party on its own viewed the
submission as being unworthy of further review under the process, and then
later acceded to such further review, 235 arguably also lends support for the
notion that the parties are able, when acting as the Council, to put aside any
parochial perspective that otherwise might be ascribed to them and operate
as custodians of the process. Bolstering the seemingly positive nature of this
Council track record is the fact that the Council has unanimously approved
the release of final factual records.236
231

See Who We Are, supra note 208 (providing Council resolutions from 1994 through the

present).
232
233
234
235

See supra Table 6.
See Who We Are, supra note 209.
Id.
See, e.g., Submission, BC Hydro (SEM-97-001), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM/97-001/01/SUB*

(April 2, 1997), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACF756.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006). In its
response, Canada urged that a factual record was not appropriate. Canada Response, BC Hydro
(SEM-97-001),
C.E.C.
Doc.
A14/SEM/97-001/05/RSP
(July
21,
1997),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-1-RSP-E.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006). But in Council
Resolution 98-07 Canada joined the United States and Mexico in voting to develop a factual
record. Council Res. 98-07, 1, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/98-00/RES/03/Rev.3 (June 24, 1998),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/98-07e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006).
236 See Council Res. 04-07, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/06/RES/1/final (Sept. 24, 2004),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/RES-04-07_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making
public the factual record for Molymex II (SEM-00-005)); Council Res. 03-03, C.E.C. Doc.
C/C.01/03-02/RES/03/Final (April 22, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/ResMBTA_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for Migratory Birds
(SEM–98-007)); Council Res. 02-01, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/02-01/RES/01/Final (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/RES02-01Metales-eng.PDF (last visited July 16, 2006)
(making public the factual record for Metales y Derivados (SEM-98-007)); Council Res. 00-04,
C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/08/Rev.1 (June 11, 2000), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/0004e_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for BC Hydro (SEM-97001)); Council Res. 03-06, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-05/RES/06 (June 23, 2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-Aquanova-06-final_en.pdf (last visited July 16,
2006) (making public the factual record for Aquanova (SEM-98-006)). Council Res. 03-12, C.E.C.
Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/12/final (Aug. 7, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-BCLogging-03-12_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for BC
Logging (SEM-00-004); Council Res. 03-13, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/13/final (Aug. 7, 2003),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-oldman-river-II_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006)
(making public the factual record for Oldman River II (SEM-97-006)); Council Res. 03-04, C.E.C.
Doc. C/C.01/03-02/RES/04/final (Apr. 22, 2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/ResTarahumara_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006) (making public the factual record for
Tarahumara (SEM-00-006)); Council Res. 03-15, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/03-06/RES/15/final (May 12,
2003), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/Res-magdalena-03-15_en.pdf (last visited July 16,
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Nevertheless, there are abundant signs in the commentary about the
process that citizens do not have complete trust in the Council or the
individual parties, and that citizens lack confidence in the neutrality of any
of the government actors. The sense one gets is that the submitter (and
prospective submitter) community views the Council as being distinctly
unenthusiastic about the process. There is considerable evidence that
submitters consider the Council extremely reluctant to fulfill its
responsibilities and, in many cases, as affirmatively undermining the
process.
The Council appears to have created this sentiment not only in actions
relating to particular submissions, but also in more routine interventions in
the process. Five specific instances of Council actions are illustrative of the
types of actions the Council has undertaken that appear to have sowed
distrust and a sense of lack of neutrality.237
First critics have criticized the Council for purportedly overstepping its
authority, and intruding on or usurping the responsibilities and authority of
the CEC Secretariat. As suggested above, the parties have not retained
plenary authority to make the decisions required under the citizen
submissions process.238 Instead, they have given the Secretariat certain
responsibilities and a significant degree of independence in the
implementation of the process, while also giving submitters certain powers
as well (notably, for present purposes, the power to launch the process and
thereby identify the alleged failures to enforce effectively that should
receive detailed scrutiny). Also, as suggested elsewhere, the question of
boundaries of authority has arisen several times during the early years of the

2006) (making public the factual record for Rio Magdalena (SEM-97-002)). The Council has not
electronically provided a Resolution authorizing release of the Cozumel factual record (SEM-96001).
237 I have not tried to include every nuance in the process that raises procedural justice
concerns. Instead, I have focused on what appear to be among the more significant concerns.
Other Council actions have triggered procedural justice concerns as well. For example, the
TRAC Report identifies other complaints submitters have made of the parties, such as not
providing information that the Secretariat has requested, delaying the process, and attempting
to pre-empt CEC review through “desultory enforcement actions.” TRAC, supra note 29, at 46.
The TRAC Report similarly found that “[m]any observers” perceived the Council’s four
November 2001 Resolutions as “contradicting” a 2000 Council Resolution that implied that the
Council would ask JPAC to “review changes to the process before they were introduced.” Id. at
44. To provide examples of other complaints not discussed in the text, Randy Christiansen
indicated that the BC Hydro submitters “alleged that the process was compromised by noncooperation and political interference by the Government of Canada, resulting in a less valuable
factual record than was possible.” Christensen, supra note 59, at 175. Chris Wold identified
three “principal means” in which the Council has, in his view, undermined the process:
The Council has adversely affected the ability of the Citizen Submission Process to
achieve better environmental results. The Council has degraded the process through
three principal means: 1) disallowing examinations of allegations of a broad pattern of
ineffective enforcement, 2) limiting the scope of factual records and 3) questioning the
sufficiency of information.
Wold, et al., supra note 58, at 423.
238 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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process.239 A common theme of the NGO community and of scholarly and
other commentary is that, for the process to operate as intended (and for it
to be credible with “civil society”), the parties need to do a better job of
adhering to the self-imposed limits contained in the NAAEC and, relatedly,
to accord appropriate respect to the Secretariat’s integral role in the
process.240 The 2004 TRAC Report notes that “if many have criticized the
Council for not providing sufficient overall direction to the Secretariat’s
environmental cooperation program, they have also expressed concern
about the Council exercizing [sic] too much direction on the administration
of articles 14/15 where the Secretariat has specific responsibilities under the
NAAEC.”241 It reports that interested stakeholders have argued that “the
Council has exceeded its legal authority by making decisions that the
NAAEC assigns to the Secretariat . . . .”242 ELI concluded that this Council
overreaching has jeopardized “public trust” in the process.243
One clear criticism has been that when the Council issued four
Resolutions in November 2001 that authorized the Secretariat to develop
factual records, as the Secretariat had recommended, the Council changed
the focus of factual records sought by submitters.244 While these
submissions alleged widespread failures to enforce,245 supported by the
239 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 762-780 (primarily focusing on
the question of boundaries of authority and discussing in more detail the issues here discussed).
Some early commentators anticipated these tensions. See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note
29, at 131–69 (charting creation and the structural conflicts inherent in NAAEC); FOUR-YEAR
REVIEW, supra note 29 (describing division of responsibilities and noting the separation of
authority). Numerous observers have commented on the presence of such tensions. See, e.g.,
Christopher Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 175 (2001) (noting tension surrounding the
submissions procedure). See generally Knox, supra note 60; Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger
Awakens: North American Environmental Law After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 395 (2001).
240 Governance of International Institutions, supra note 27, at 762–80; see, e.g., Comm’n for
Envtl.
Cooperation,
Advice
to
Council
No:
01-07
(Oct.
23,
2001),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/01-07E.pdf (last visited May 28, 2006) (expressing frustration
with the council’s actions in connection with the citizen submissions process).
241 TRAC, supra note 29, at 32.
242 TRAC, supra note 29, at 45.
243 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 23–24 (providing opposing views on the authority of the
Council); see also Id. at iii (noting that to be effective, the Secretariat “needs to maintain its
independence as a neutral investigative body in order to ensure public trust in the [citizen
submissions] process”).
244 Council Res. 01-08, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/03/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www
.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-08e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-10,
C.E.C.
Doc.
C/C.01/01-06/RES/01/FINAL
(Nov.
16,
2001),
http://www.cec.org/
files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-01-09e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-10, C.E.C. Doc.
C/C.01/01-06/RES/04/FINAL (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res-0110e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006); Council Res. 01-11, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/FINAL
(Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf (last visited Apr. 11,
2006).
245 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al, Submission to the Commission on Environmental
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, (SEM 99-002), C.E.C. Doc. A14/SEM-99-002/01/SUB (Nov. 17, 1999),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/99-2-SUB-E.pdf (last visited May 21, 2006) (alleging failure to
enforce effectively the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in the United States).
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Secretariat’s Recommendations to develop factual records of a scope broad
enough to detect such failures, the Council’s Resolutions directed the
Secretariat to only develop factual records concerning the specific examples
of failures to enforce effectively asserted by the submitters.246 A February
2002 memorandum from the director of the CEC Secretariat’s submissions
unit to the chair of the JPAC makes this clear:
[T]he Council included instructions [in the four Resolutions] to prepare factual
records regarding specific cases raised in the submissions, but did not include
instructions regarding allegations in each of those submissions of widespread
failures to effectively enforce environmental laws. For each of those four
submissions, the Secretariat had recommended preparing factual records in
regard to the widespread allegations of failures to effectively enforce.247

In its review of the Council’s actions, ELI concluded that “[p]ersuasive
textual arguments can be and have been made to suggest that the Council’s
resolutions were not within the scope of authority granted to it under the
NAAEC.”248 ELI continued by stating that the Council’s actions also “appear
to violate the object and purpose, or ‘spirit,’ of the Agreement, the
fundamental objectives of which include the enhancement of transparency
and public participation in environmental decision making.”249 ELI
concluded that “by intervening in the fact-finding process, the Council [was]
undermining the independence of the Secretariat and the credibility of the
process.”250
The Council’s actions may have contributed to a loss of citizen trust in
the citizen submissions process or trust in the Council, and thereby may
have potentially contributed to a decline in use of the process. As the TRAC
report concludes:
There is an argument to be made that the process could generate more
environmental benefits if the Council sought to restrict it less. Some observers
have argued, for example, that the actions of the Council have eroded the

246

See supra note 239 (containing Secretariat’s recommendations).

247

Memorandum from Geoffrey Garver, Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters
Unit, requesting information on issues in JPAC Advice to Council 01-09, 2 (Feb. 15, 2002),
available at www.cec.org/files/PDF/SEM/Memo-garver-e.pdf. ELI has reached this conclusion as
well, noting that the Council “significantly narrowed the scope of the investigation” in each of
its Resolutions. ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iii. ELI notes that:
“[a]lthough the Council approved the preparation of factual records with respect to each
of these submissions, it significantly narrowed the scope of the investigation. That is,
rather than order the preparation of factual records on the alleged widespread failure to
effectively enforce, it instructed the Secretariat to develop factual records concerning
only specific examples of the alleged widespread failure that were detailed in the
submission.”

Id. at 5–6. As might be expected, NGOs, including several submitters, have articulated this view
and criticized the Council for its actions. Governance of International Institutions, supra note
27, at 781–93.
248 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iv.
249
250

Id.
Id.
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credibility of the process and are directly responsible for the fact that no new

submissions have been brought against the United States Government in the
last four years and that large environmental NGOs are not using the process.251

A second criticism is that the Council has taken actions that have
circumscribed the scope of the CEC process and thereby limited its utility.
The TRAC Report notes that “[t]he Council has adopted a series of measures
over the years to narrow the process’s scope.”252 It also notes that “JPAC, the
NACs, the US GAC, academics, independent observers and NGOs have
widely and repeatedly criticized the Council for these actions.”253
Citizens have criticized the four November 2001 Council Resolutions
discussed above as an example of Council actions that have sought to
narrow the scope of the process and the types of enforcement failures that it
may address. In an October 2003 report to JPAC concerning these four
Resolutions, ELI concluded that:
[T]he Council jeopardized the ability of those [factual] records to fully expose
the controversy at issue. Specifically, the factual records were not able to
address evidence of widespread enforcement failures, cumulative effects that
stem from such widespread patterns, or the broader concerns of submitters
about implementation of enforcement policies.254

The Secretariat, as well as outside observers such as ELI, have highlighted
specific ways in which the Resolutions changed (and limited) the types of
information the Secretariat developed compared to the types of information
it would have developed had the Resolutions endorsed the submissions and
recommendations.255 Chris Wold, among others, has claimed that the
Council Resolutions, in rejecting broad-based factual records that focus on
alleged widespread enforcement failures, significantly reduced the value of
the citizen submissions process because, at least in the United States, it is
those types of enforcement failures that citizens have limited ability to
address through domestic mechanisms:
Submitters quickly recognized that the process was especially useful when
examining a broader pattern of government conduct which, if not adequately
justified or explained, might reveal a systematic failure to enforce
environmental law. This is especially true in the United States where the
Supreme Court has ruled that an agency’s decision not to take enforcement
action with respect to a specific case is “presumed immune from judicial
review.”256

251

TRAC, supra note 29, at 46.
Id. at 44.
253 Id. at 45.
254 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at iv.
255 ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 6–13, 27 (2003); Kibel, supra note 239, at 416–71;
Christensen, supra note 59, at 178–80.
256 Wold et al., supra note 58, at 423 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
252
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In a recent article, Wold says explicitly:
Without question, the submitters would never have prepared Migratory Birds if
they had known that the Council would, in an arbitrary and unexplained
fashion, limit the record to two specific instances cited only as examples of
widespread government nonenforcement. 257

He indicates that “[t]he Migratory Birds submitters found the Citizen
Submission Process attractive only because of its capacity to investigate the
United States’ broad pattern of nonenforcement of the MBTA.”258 His
conclusion about the results of the Council’s narrowing the scope of the
factual record in connection with the submission he prepared does not
inspire much confidence in citizens’ current perceptions of the value of the
process:
The absurdity of the result is patent: the Council directed the Secretariat to
develop a factual record in Migratory Birds that resembled neither the issues
presented by the submitters nor those recommended for study by the
Secretariat. Indeed, it is the factual record that nobody wanted.259

Third, the Council has been criticized for failing adequately to explain
its decisions, particularly when it rejects Secretariat recommendations to
prepare factual records.260 The Council, in the first resolution that rejected a
Secretariat recommendation to prepare a factual record, provided no
explanation at all for the Council’s decision.261 John Knox noted that the
Council “simply denied the development of a factual record without further
explanation,” and charged that “such a decision runs counter to the entire
conception of NACEC and NAAEC.” 262

257
258
259

Id. at 426.
Id.
Id. at 427. Randy Christensen offers a similar view on this issue:

Unfortunately, initial predictions that the mechanism was vulnerable to political
manipulation have proven accurate over 10 years. Council actions have prevented a
fulsome investigation of allegations of enforcement failure in many cases, depriving
submitters and the public generally of a unique opportunity for discussing enforcement
failures and improving environmental law enforcement. Given initial objections to the
citizen submission process by the Canadian and Mexican governments . . . it is not
surprising that Parties have used their powers to influence the process.
Christensen, supra note 59, at 180–81.
260 The Council later explained its reasons for limiting the scope of factual records in a June
2004 letter to JPAC. Letter from José Manuel Bulas Montoro, Alternate Representative for
Mexico, Council of the Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, to Donna Tingley, 2004 Chair, Joint Pub.
Advisory Comm., Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation (June 3, 2004) (on file with author). The
Council also addresses the “sufficiency of information” issue in this letter. Id.
261 Council Res. 00-01, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/00-04/RES/0/Rev.03 (May 16, 2000),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/res01r3e_EN.pdf (last visited July 15, 2006).
262 See JPAC WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 4 (reporting a paraphrasing of all participants’
comments). John Knox commented that Council should explain in all cases why it adopted a
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In response to this criticism, in 2001 the Council agreed to explain its
rationale for dismissing submissions for which the Secretariat had
recommended development of a factual record,263 but the explanation the
Council has provided to date has been of limited utility.264
It is likely that the JPAC, in Lessons Learned, has captured the public’s
view of this state of affairs, notably that the Council should provide
reasoned explanations for its decisions, just as is expected of the
Secretariat:
The articles 14 and 15 process should . . . be characterized by decision-making
that is open, informed and reasoned. The current Guidelines require the
Secretariat staff to indicate its reasons for a decision under article 15(1) to
recommend a factual record and at certain other decision-making points within
the article 14(1) and (2) reviews. These requirements provide the Parties, the
Council and the public with the requisite confidence that the review is being
conducted both openly and on a reasoned basis. For this reason, similar
considerations should govern any Council decision not to accept the
Secretariat’s recommendation to develop a factual record. The obligation to
state substantive reasons for important governmental decisions affecting the
environment should not be seen as an unreasonable burden, particularly where
the Secretariat has, after investigation, indicated its reasons for recommending
such a factual record.265

Fourth, the Council has taken actions that citizens have complained
make it more difficult for them to use the process effectively.266 The 2004
Resolution on whether or not to develop a factual record. Id. Knox pointed out that this did not
occur in the Quebec Hog Farm case. Id.
263 Council Res. 01-06, 2, C.E.C. Doc. C/01-00/RES/06/Rev.4 (June 29, 2001),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Res-06r4_EN.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006).
264 See Council Res. 02-03, C.E.C. Doc. C/C.01/02-01/RES/03/Final (May 17, 2002),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/council_res_02-03_en.pdf (last visited July 16, 2006).
265 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 15–16. Also related to the issue of reasoned
explanations, the Council has been characterized as opposing allowing the Secretariat to reach
formal conclusions, or to make recommendations, regarding allegations of a failure to
effectively enforce, and several commentators have criticized this aspect of the process. JPAC
WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 7–8. John Knox’s comments were summarized as contending that
[E]ven though NAAEC does not explicitly prohibit factual records from containing
conclusion or recommendations, that is a point that JPAC should not support, since the
Parties are convinced that the purpose of factual records is not to reach conclusions of
law. . . . [Knox] felt the battle is not worth fighting, since the Parties will most certainly
put up a resistance.

Id.; see also LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 13, stating that:
[M]any commentators believed that factual records should be able to reach
conclusions . . . as to a Party’s “effective enforcement of its environmental law” . . . and
should also include recommendations for further action by a Party to impose the
effectiveness of such enforcement. Other, however, believed that JPAC should not
support such an approach since the Parties believe that the purpose of factual records is
not to reach “conclusions of law” and will resist these proposals.

Id. These concerns seemingly raise distributive as well as procedural justice concerns.
266 JPAC WORKSHOP, supra note 171, at 5.
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TRAC report suggests that Council actions “may make it prohibitively
difficult for citizens to file submissions.”267 Similarly, in its 2003 report ELI
indicates that the Council has increased the burden on submitters—that the
increased level of specificity required means that concerned citizens groups
must expend more in manpower and money to research exact violations
rather than just relying on “evidence of widespread, systemic failures to
enforce” environmental laws.268 As JPAC put it in a 2003 memo, “[d]efining
the scope of factual records to require citizens’ groups to detail every
specific violation to be included in the Secretariat’s investigations potentially
increases the financial and human resources burdens placed on these
groups.”269
Finally, there is the issue of confidentiality. Despite the emphasis the
NAAEC gives to increasing transparency and accountability,270 the Council
has on occasion taken actions that reduce transparency, and these actions
have triggered complaints from citizens. For example, in 1999 the Council
acted to preclude the Secretariat from making public its recommendation to
the Council to develop a factual record until thirty days had passed.271 In
Lessons Learned, the JPAC summarized citizen sentiment on this Councilimposed limitation on transparency as follows:
The commentators spoke virtually as one against the requirements that a
Secretariat recommendation to the Council . . . be withheld from the public for
30 days after its submission to the Council. It was widely agreed that there is
“no need” for the requirement, that “it should be eliminated,” that it is
impractical, and that it does not stand up to serious analysis, and that, in
general, it seriously undermines the purpose of the articles 14 and 15
process.272

267

TRAC, supra note 29, at 45.
ISSUES RELATED, supra note 29, at 19. A similar complaint is that “[t]he Council’s
resolutions appear to require submitters to allege specific violations in order to support the
development of a factual record.” Id. at 19
269 Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation, supra note 218, at 2.
270 See, e.g., NAAEC, supra note 28, art. 1(h) (identifying transparency as one of the goals);
Yang, supra note 169, at 444 (indicating that transparency is the “major goal” of the process).
The Council itself frequently touts its commitment to transparency and the importance the
NAAEC gives to transparency as an objective. See, e.g., Council Res. 99-06, C.E.C. Doc. C/9900/07/Rev.3 (June 28, 1999), http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/99-06e_EN.pdf (last visited
July 14, 2006) (noting the importance of transparency and fairness in the citizen submissions
process); Council Res. 00-09, C.E.C. Doc. C/00-00/RES/09/Rev.2 (June 13, 2000),
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/COUNCIL/00-09e_EN.pdf (last visited July 14, 2006) (similarly
recognizing the importance of transparency in the citizen submissions process).
271 See generally Council, Council's View on Council Resolution 00-09, 3 (Nov. 2004),
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/COUNCIL/Council-Report-00-09_en.pdf (last visited July 15, 2006)
(opining on the change to section 10.2 of the Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement
Matters under articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC that previously directed the Secretariat to notify
the public that the Secretariat had made a recommendation 30 days after the Secretariat
submitted the recommendation); Guidelines for Submissions, supra note 72, at 10.2 (directing
the Secretariat to notify the public that the Secretariat had made a recommendation 30 days
after the Secretariat submitted the recommendation).
272 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 10. JPAC itself formally recommended that the
“current 30-day ‘blackout’ period should either be abolished or substantially reduced.” Id. at 16;
268
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It was only after citizen complaints about this directive that the Council
revised it to allow the Secretariat to make its recommendations available to
the public (in addition to providing them to the Council) in a more timely
manner.273
Also on the issue of confidentiality, in Lessons Learned JPAC reported
that “[s]everal commentators expressed concern regarding what they
perceived as an increase in parties’ reliance on the confidentiality provisions
of [the NAAEC].”274 JPAC itself expressed the view that:
[A] Party’s right to invoke that [the confidential information] defense against
disclosure should be narrowly construed and should be limited to those
circumstances in which it is expressly authorized by [the NAAEC]. . . . Anything
broader than that . . . will serve principally to dilute the effectiveness of a
procedure that relies on public disclosure and scrutiny for its credibility and
acceptance. If a Party invokes the privacy defense, it should state the reasons
and the provisions it relies on.275

Chris Wold, the attorney whose submission led to the only factual
record concerning U.S. enforcement practices, shares many of the critiques
of the Council examined above. He notes:
[E]arly support [for the process] . . . has waned considerably as the decisions of
the CEC’s Council . . . have eroded public confidence in the process. The
Council has marginalized the Secretariat’s independence by narrowing the
scope of submissions, a role designated to the Secretariat. In addition, it has
ignored the JPAC’s advice on implementation of the submission process.
Moreover, the member governments have chosen to treat the Citizen
Submission process as adversarial, rather than cooperative. . . .

....
The Council . . . [has] seriously inhibited the Citizen Submission Process from
achieving more positive environmental results and deeply undermined the
Secretariat and the JPAC. Consequently, support for the Citizen Submission
Process in the United States is very low.276

Wold concludes:
Environmental groups who have supported the development and
implementation of the Citizen Submission Process are growing increasingly
frustrated over the Council’s unwillingness to respect the boundaries
established in the process. If this perception continues, many of the groups
who have supported and defended the Citizen Submission Process may simply
abandon the process and declare it, and the CEC, inappropriately tailored to
meet the challenges of environmental enforcement.

see also JPAC Workshop, supra note 171, at 4 (suggesting that the 30 day delay is “nonsensical,
impractical and does not stand up to serious analysis”).
273 Council Res. 01-06, supra note 181 at 1–2.
274 LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 29, at 11.
275 Id. at 17; see also Yang, supra note 169, at 454, 475–76.
276 Wold, supra note 58, at 417–18. The Council has responded to some of these criticisms.
See, e.g., Montoro, supra note 260.
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The Council certainly knows what it must do to restore public confidence in
the process and to ensure its effectiveness. It must release its grip on the
process and embrace the NAAEC’s cooperative spirit. The question is whether
it has the political will to do so.277

VI. CONCLUSION
Strong interest exists today in increasing citizen participation in
governance to bolster government legitimacy. There may be a number of
reasons why a mechanism of governance intended to facilitate or encourage
such participation is or is not effective in doing so. Success or failure may be
due to factors largely extrinsic to the mechanism or process itself, such as
the low priority that prospective citizen participants give to the issues the
process addresses, limited citizen resources, or the availability of alternative
processes. Similarly, the outcomes available through a process may limit
citizen interest in participating in it. People’s “preferences for the processes
by which . . . policy decisions are made” may be relevant as well.278
This Article suggests that the psychology literature on procedural
justice offers one framework for thinking about the design of institutions to
encourage citizen involvement. This literature seeks to advance
understanding of the types of process features that are likely to yield high
levels of participant satisfaction, and the types of features that are not. This
Article applies this literature in the context of a particular governance
mechanism that is intended to encourage meaningful citizen involvement
and, indeed, depends on it, the CEC citizen submissions process, in order to
explore why early citizen enthusiasm for the process may have turned into
citizen disaffection, at least with respect to use of the process to challenge
U.S. enforcement policies and practices. Using the terminology from the
psychology literature, it appear that citizen concerns about neutrality and
trust, in particular, may be affecting citizen confidence in the process and
their interest in using it.279
Systematic, empirical work is a logical next step to test the sense of the
commentary that this Article offers. In the context of the CEC process,
empirical work would be helpful, for example, to confirm (or not) the
sentiments expressed in the commentary concerning possible reasons why

277 Wold, supra note 58, at 443–44. Randy Christensen, a principal Canadian submitter,
echoes Mr. Wold’s concerns: “The repeated attempts by Council to influence the handling of
specific submissions have not only impeded the operation of the spotlight, but have also
undermined public confidence in the process.” Christensen, supra note 59, at 184–85. But he
continues: “Despite these deficiencies, it is likely that the environmental groups will continue to
use the mechanism in attempts to deal with non-enforcement issues within Canada, as there are
few domestic alternatives.” Id.
278 WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT, supra note 18, at 4. Of course, because of other
considerations, it may be that “[citizen] disapprobation of the current system [is] preferable to
the style of government that would make the people happy.” Id. at 1. Further, other factors
besides the process design issues discussed in the procedural justice literature may affect
citizen satisfaction.
279 See supra Part III (discussing these terms).
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citizen satisfaction with the process appears to be limited and to have
declined in recent years, at least with regard to submissions involving the
United States. Related, there would seem to be considerable potential value
in exploring systematically why submissions concerning Mexico and Canada
have not experienced similar declines. Future empirical work concerning
the CEC citizen submission mechanism might focus on at least three
questions that in particular seem well worth exploring: 1) what features of
the process are of greatest importance or salience to citizens from a
procedural justice perspective; 2) what is the relative importance of
procedural justice vis-á-vis distributive justice concerns; and 3) how relevant
are extrinsic factors (such as culture, the availability of alternative
mechanisms, etc.) to citizens’ interest in using the process.
Beyond the specific context of the CEC citizen submission process, this
Article suggests the possible value of multi-faceted analyses of institutions
of governance that are intended to promote citizen participation, and the
potential value of the procedural justice literature as one tool in undertaking
such analyses. Systematic work on citizen satisfaction obviously will be
helpful in developing more informed and sophisticated understandings
generally of the features of decision making processes that citizens value.280
As this work yields greater understanding, it will be up to policy makers and
others to use this knowledge to revisit mechanisms that already exist and to
design new mechanisms of governance.281

280 Gibson, supra note 7, at 538, 555 (noting that “we have a long way to go in understanding
the relationship between institutional performance and legitimacy” and that “only with more
valid measures of institutional legitimacy can we make progress in unraveling the causal
linkages between performance and legitimacy”).
281 For one such observation, see, e.g., Christensen, supra note 59, at 180–81 (suggesting that
formally constituted advisory groups may serve as an effective counterweight to reduce
possible government interference). What was not foreseen was the level of success that groups
and advisory groups (such as the JPAC) would have in resisting Council attempts to manipulate
and “reform” the process. The participation of the formal advisory groups have been central to
maintaining the integrity of the citizen submission process. In each case where Council
attempts have been rebuffed, the advisory groups have issued formal “advice” or
communications to the Council.
Christensen suggests that “the environmental side agreement’s strong environmental
mandate and formal public advisory bodies have proven surprisingly effective counterbalances
to Council abuses. With sufficient reform, the mechanism could provide a model for addressing
environmental concerns in future trade agreements.” Id. at 165.

